THE DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY

ROBERT JOHN BAXTER

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THE DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY

A Thesis
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Master of Science
in Public Administration

By

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PREFACE

The placement of the numerous skills and abilities possessed by the people required to operate a large organization presents a complex problem. The American Navy is no exception. The Navy's problem is further complicated by the mobility of its ships and aircraft, the need for rotation of its personnel in order for it to gain broad experience and for morale reasons, and the fact that its manpower in peacetime serves as the cadre for wartime expansion. The graduates of the recruit training programs must be assigned to technical schools and to the numerous ships, aircraft units, and shore installations in accordance with need and with each man's existing skills and future potentialities.

The fundamental basis of selection of personnel, both in industry and in the civil service is the position concept. In other words, people are selected for employment from a number of applicants because their existing skills and abilities match the needs of the particular vacant positions. The Navy operates on the career concept. It selects from the total number of applicants the number required to maintain the service at a given total strength. Through vestibule and on-the-job training it adjusts the aptitudes, skills, and special abilities of these individuals to meet the broad occupational requirements of the service. As an individual's in-service experience increases, advanced training and subsequent reassignments become more specific. The Navy must achieve the maximum productivity from the skilled manpower it currently possesses. Except during emergencies, it cannot procure advanced skills from outside sources to fill vacancies above the entrance level, which is at the

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bottom. It must meet its fluctuating needs by continual adjustment of existing skills by inter-unit transfer.

From January 1949 to May 1950 the author served as personnel officer for Commander, Cruisers-Destroyers, a type commander in the Pacific Fleet. During this difficult period of naval expansion and contraction, this type command consisted of over eighty-five ships and staffs and over twenty thousand men. While attempting to find a solution to the placement problem for the manpower of this command, the question came to mind whether the placement function belonged at this level of the Navy's administrative hierarchy. Upon arrival at Ohio State University, this study was undertaken to attempt to find an answer to this question.

The answer to few problems concerning the Navy will be found directly in any published works. The Navy's manuals prescribe the broad standards which guide the distribution of enlisted personnel. The specific details can be found only in actual experience with the problem.

With the principles of personnel placement obtained from the published works on the Navy, other military organizations, civilian industry, and the federal civil service as a foundation, the author applied reflective thought to the fruits of experience gained by over nine years of actual working with naval enlisted personnel placement problems. This includes consultations with experienced naval officers in the field and actual observation of the methods and results obtained on all levels of the administrative hierarchy.

The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the present methods used by the naval service to distribute and place its enlisted personnel in light of the needs of the fleets. If it does not meet these needs adequately, the closest approach to a perfect system must be found. Certain

suggestions designed to secure such improvements are made in the final chapter. The first four chapters will present the Navy and its distribution system to the reader. The last four chapters will evaluate this system with the view of procuring the greatest productivity of the Navy's manpower.

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CHAPTER I

THE NAVY AND ITS MANPOWER

The Manpower

The United States Navy ranks as one of the larger organizations in the world today. While its authorized strength may vary, depending on appropriations and manpower limitations, in peace it is a different type of organization than when engaged in its primary wartime purpose, that of seeking out the enemy and destroying his effectiveness. In peace, military organizations are nuclei for gigantic expansion in a short period of time when an emergency arises. The basic organization structure must exist, plans must be ready, and the cadre broadly trained in order that it may serve as a skeleton upon which the mobilized force can be constructed and prepared to accomplish its mission. The augmentation in time of war comes from the reserves and from the civilian population. These elements must be assimilated into the skeleton organization as rapidly as possible when war comes. As far as possible they must be trained. The reserves have such training. The final augmentation from the civilian population needs both basic and technical skill.

The operating unity of the naval function is the ship and the plane. Each operates with a singularity of purpose. Each survives or perishes as a result of its singular effort. If one of the parts fails, the existence of all the other parts are in jeopardy. The complexity of its internal organization must be a paragon of co-ordinated effort.

All higher command and all auxiliary activities exist to use and serve the ship and the plane as they are the Navy's offensive and defensive power. For administrative reasons and for the purposes of this study, each ship, aircraft squadron, shore base, and higher command and its staff will be referred to as a basic team. Each works for a common purpose. The shore base must serve the fleet. The higher commands and their staff must co-ordinate the fleet's effort. Each basic team has a particular job to do, working in co-ordination with others, in each battle of each war.

Each basic team is more than the sum of its parts. Its success or failure in the accomplishment of its mission depends upon the abilities and skills of the crew, from the Captain to the newest recruit. Success is dependent not only upon the individual abilities and skills of each member, but also upon the interaction of all these abilities and skills, commonly known as team work. This is the quality that makes each ship and each plane an operating entity. The destruction of the enemy is not the doing of any one man. It requires all, the quartermaster, the gunner's mate, the machinist's mate, the steward, and many others, all members of the crew working as a common team. In a modern destroyer persons with more than twenty-seven different occupational skills work together for the accomplishment of its mission. A new ship, just commissioned and staffed with persons having all the necessary skills, would not be effective in battle due to the lack of team skill. Only after many arduous months of intensive training at sea as a team can the ship become an effective part of the fleet.

Even during peacetime, the Navy operates its ships and planes

to the four corners of the world, with resulting major problems of communication, supply, and administration. Its complement now is approaching three quarters of a million men and women. This coupled with the large number of units and their worldwide dispersion makes the problem of providing persons with the numerous skills required at the proper time and place both interesting and challenging.

Except in times of mobilization, the Navy does not reach out into the labor market and compete with industry for the trained men and women it requires. It is a career service and, except during war, entrance is from the bottom, either in the officer or enlisted grades. Navy skills are somewhat different from those usually encountered in industry. For each job there must be a man with not only the technical know-how but also an equally important military skill. Military skill can only be gained by experience and training in the service. True, in times of rapid mobilization, the acquisition of this skill must be accelerated or temporarily sacrificed because of the urgency of the situation. The regular forces must bear the principal share of the burden until the new members can acquire this skill. Learning is hastened during wartime because of the motivation afforded by the situation. In addition, during wartime the emphasis is placed on technical specialization both for the reserves and for the civilian force. The broad training essential for the skeleton regular force would not be practical because of urgency. When an emergency arises, the armed forces must effectively utilize the skills available and train the non-skilled recruits as rapidly as possible to fill their fluctuating requirements. The regular force must be ready to absorb

and train the new manpower while they continue to carry on their present duties. Their training must be broad as well as intensive as they must prepare the augmenting increments to meet the Navy's needs as well as stand the initial shock of war.

The Organization

In the Navy Department in Washington, D. C., top policy and strategy are determined. The numerous bureaus are the technical assistants to the Chief of Naval Operations who is the top military commander in the naval forces. The major field commands reporting to this officer are the Commander-in-Chiefs of both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and the commandants of the various naval districts. These top naval commands are illustrated on page five.

During war the two major fleets are subdivided into other fleets to lessen the span of control of the major fleet commander, for example, The Seventh Fleet, The Ninth Fleet. These sub-fleets are numbered odd in the Pacific Fleet and even in the Atlantic Fleet.

The two major fleets operate on two basic chains of command. The operational chain is the sub-fleet and the task force, and the administrative chain is the type command. Both of these are centered in the commander-in-chief of the major fleet. The task force is a flexible organization, formed to accomplish a specific task or series of tasks. Its internal organization varies. Ships and aircraft units join and leave the task force as requirements dictate. Upon completion of a task, the entire organization may be dissolved and absorbed into other task forces. Thus, a ship may have several different superior operating commanders over a period of time. These task forces are



TOP COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

further subdivided into groups which are in turn subdivided into units. These subordinate organizations also fluctuate in their internal organization. For example, at a given moment the U.S.S. Blank may be attached to Task Unit 91.6.2. This means that the lowest sub-group, the task unit to which the U.S.S. Blank belongs, is the second task unit of Task Group 6 of Task Force 91 of the Ninth Fleet.

This flexible task force organization meets the operating needs, but it cannot meet administrative needs, which by their nature require continuity. This problem is met by the type commands. Each ship or aircraft squadron reports to the fleet's type commander which represents its type. Each destroyer would report to commander, destroyers; each cruiser to commander, cruisers; and each aircraft carrier to commander, air forces. These may be combined, as in the present case in the Pacific Fleet, the Commander, Cruisers-Destroyers, is the administrative commander over cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, escorts, etc. The need for this type of organization is based upon more than administrative continuity. A ship or aircraft unit needs a superior who is by experience cognizant of the particular problems of that type of ship or of aircraft. The staffs of these commanders are experienced in the problems of the type as they usually have had many years of experience at sea in such a ship or in aircraft. With such assistance the type commander is well qualified to represent all ships or aircraft of his type before the fleet commander.

The co-ordinating commands subordinate to the type commander also have their position in the operational chain of command. The commander of a squadron of destroyers may also be a task unit commander.

The types of subordinate commands vary with the type of ship or aircraft involved. Destroyers are combined into flotillas and these in turn are further divided into squadrons and then divisions. Battleships, cruisers, and aircraft carriers are usually combined into divisions only. Aircraft are combined into squadrons, air groups or wing commands, and fleet air commands. Each of these commands has a commander responsible to a superior and eventually to the type commander.

The fleet's shore support outside of the continental U.S.A. is centered in the several area commands. The fleet's geographic area is divided up into areas or naval districts. For example, the Marianas Area is commanded by Commander, Marianas. The Hawaiian Area is the 14th Naval District commanded by the District Commandant. Naval districts outside of the continental U.S.A. are subordinate to the fleet commander. Naval Districts within the continental U.S.A. are subordinate to the Navy Department, Washington, D. C. The area commands of the fleet furnish services and shore support to the ships and aircraft of the fleet. They also may serve governmental functions in certain areas. The top command relationships of a typical fleet are illustrated on page eight.

The Problem

At present enlisted personnel is distributed to the type and area commanders in a wholesale manner. In other words, the Bureau of Naval Personnel distributes personnel from the training centers, the receiving stations, and the continental shore stations to the two major fleet commanders for further assignment to their subordinate commands. The fleet commanders, in turn, assign the personnel to their type and



COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN A TYPICAL FLEET

area commanders. The personnel officer of the type or area commander assigns each man to a specific duty station (a ship, aircraft squadron, staff, or shore station). It is at this point where the crucial assignment or distribution is made. In the case of petty officers, it is almost tantamount to assignment to a specific job at the duty station. In the case of men of the below petty officer grades, it amounts to providing the raw material by which the duty station must train skills. Nevertheless, correct placement by the type or area commander is necessary because certain potentialities are more important than others to any given ship, aircraft squadron, or shore station. The term placement will be used to identify this distribution of personnel to a specific basic team. Except for the commanding officer's specific assignment of duties to a man, it is the closest approach to placement in naval personnel distribution. Placement is also known to many in the naval service as detailing, but the term placement is considered more appropriate in the case of enlisted personnel. In effect, the availability of the right man to assign to the right job is dependent upon the efficiency of this placement. If the personnel officer of the type or area command does not have men with the right skills available to assign to his activities, it is up to him to take steps to procure them. This may be by redistribution within the command or by informing superior commands in order that training plans can be modified to provide them. Each naval activity must do its utmost to develop skills in the unskilled persons of the command to provide for current needs and potential losses. Time and the aptitudes available do place limitations on what can be done. The officers responsible for the

placement function must provide for those needs which cannot be met locally as well as distribute the unskilled manpower.

The major problem of this thesis is to determine if the present system of distributing enlisted personnel is the most efficient which can be devised to meet the manpower needs of the fleet. If not, then the problem is to devise a method which will meet the needs. The distribution of personnel is necessary. The crux of the problem lies at the placement level of distribution.

CHAPTER II

DISTRIBUTION AND PLACEMENT AIDS

The Need for Aids

It is inconceivable that any method could be devised for distributing Navy skills amongst so many widely dispersed operating units and shore establishments without mechanical aids of some type. The officer charged with the responsibility of providing for the personnel needs of the basic teams within any given command, must know (1) the needs of each of the teams for which he is responsible, (2) the qualifications of each man in the command, and (3) the qualifications of each man available for assignment. Thus, the distribution aids must meet two requirements. They must indicate, first, what skills are required for each basic team. These needs will be consistent by type of basic team throughout the service. Second, the skills of each enlisted man must be known and made available in some form. The former requirement is met by complements, allowances, and billet specifications. The latter requirement is met by the Navy's rating structure, job classifications, and the Navy's personnel accounting system. The function of these aids will be described in detail.

A personnel officer cannot ask the commanding officer of each ship what personnel he needs and then interview each man available to ascertain if he could fill a part of these needs. Except in a very small command this would be an impossibility. As personnel officer for the Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Pacific Fleet, the author was responsible for filling the personnel needs of over eighty-five ships and staffs spread

over the whole Pacific Ocean. This force consisted of over twenty thousand men. At times, the daily placement of personnel, in this office alone, was over six hundred men. Each of these had to be assigned to the ship or staff which was in the greatest need of his particular skills. It is evident that some aids were necessary so that personnel could be assigned rapidly, yet efficiently.

The Navy's distribution and placement aids do fill this need. It may be possible to make these aids even more efficient, however, this is not the purpose of this study. The existing aids will be described and accepted as they are.

Complements and Allowances

Complements determine the war strength of each naval activity. "The complement of an activity is established by the Chief of Naval Personnel to indicate for officers by corps and grade and for enlisted personnel by rating group and pay grade, the numbers necessary to carry out effectively the mission of the activity in time of war."[1] For each basic team, the complement would be the established personnel requirements in each of the numerous Navy skills for maximum efficiency in time of war. These are standardized for each type of ship or other naval activity by the Bureau of Naval Personnel after accurate service-wide determination of needs. With this aid the personnel officer can know just how many men of each pay grade of each rating group must be provided for any given ship or other naval activity. Naval commands

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[1] Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948 (Washington: 1948), art. A-2102.

may initiate correspondence to the Bureau of Naval Personnel on any changes they may consider appropriate. These requests are given careful consideration and appropriate action is taken to change the complement of all ships or other naval activities of a similar type if considered justified.

In times of peace, it is not possible to maintain ships and other naval activities at their wartime complements. This is due to the lack of available manpower and the reduced requirements on the basic teams. To set a standard of personnel requirements for peacetime, allowances are used. As complements determine the needs during wartime, allowances determine the needs (or at least what is possible) during peacetime. The Chief of Naval Operations determines the Personnel Allocation Plan for each fiscal year. This plan "allocates among the individual activities of the naval establishment the total numbers of officers and enlisted personnel which are expected to be in the Navy on a prescribed date."[2] Knowing the personnel the budget will permit and the number of activities which must be maintained, the Bureau of Naval Personnel determines the allowance of each activity.

> Allowances translate overall numbers into specific numbers of ranks and ratings in accordance with the military requirements on each activity. These allowances then serve as a guide in procurement, training, and distribution.[3]

This is the peacetime guide to assist the personnel officer to determine the requirements of each ship or other naval activity.

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[2] Ibid., art. A-2101.

[3] Captain W. M. Cole, USN, "Complements, Allowances and Billets," Proceedings of the Personnel Officers Conference, 1949. (Washington: Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1949), p. 12.

Billet Specifications

A program of billet analysis is now in progress in the Navy. This program began during the latter years of the second World War when it was found that more adequate and detailed information on Navy skills was required. The result will be a complete set of billet specifications for each billet on each type of ship or other naval activity in service. This will give the personnel officers more details on the human requirements of each Navy billet.[4] Each specification will provide the following information:

The Billet Number
The Navy Job Classification Code
The Location of the Billet
The Billet Summary
Types and Descriptions of Duties
Equipment Used

The Rating Structure

There are sixty-two occupations or general service ratings for enlisted personnel in the peacetime Navy. During wartime because of the emphasis placed upon specialization, this number is increased to approximately two hundred, and these are known as emergency service ratings. The emergency service ratings are narrower and more specialized. For example, the general service rating of Boatswain's Mate is subdivided into the emergency service ratings of Shipboard Boatswain's Mate, Construction Battalion Boatswain's Mate, Canvasman, Rigger, and Stevedore. During an emergency, all enlisted personnel, both USN and

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[4] In the Navy the term "billet" is synonymous with the industrial term "job" and means a group of duties, tasks, and responsibilites designed to be performed by one person.

Reserves, is classified according to the emergency service ratings. The term "rating group" means the specialized career fields occupied by petty officers. A few of these are:[5]

Boatswain's Mate (BM)
Quartermaster (QM)
Radarman (RD)
Fire Control Technician (FT)
Mineman (MN)
Instrumentman (IM)
Opticalman (OM)
Machinist's Mate (MM)

By means of these rating groups, each man is classified into a broad career field. These career fields are narrowed down when the emergency service ratings are used. Below the petty officer groups, the general apprentice career fields are much broader and descriptions are more general. These fields are known as rates. There are seven general apprentice fields for beginners as follows:

Seaman (SN)
Fireman (FN)
Construction Man (CN)
Airman (AN)
Hospitalman (HN)
Dentalman (DN)
Stewardsman (TN)

When an apprentice has completed the prescribed course at a specialized Navy school or has, through naval experience, proven his abilities in a particular skill, he is designated in one of the career fields of petty officers. This is an additional aid to the personnel officer in placing him on a ship or other naval activity which requires his particular talent and insures that his skills will be utilized properly since once

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[5] More detailed information on the descriptions of Navy rating groups may be found in the United States Navy Occupational Handbook (Washington: Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1948).

he enters a career field occupied by petty officers, he must be used in that particular field. For example, a seaman (SN) who has successfully completed the Navy school for fire control technicians would have the rate of fire control technician seaman (FTSN). He would normally be assigned to a ship or other naval activity which had a vacancy in the fire control technician rating group, and he would be used to work in his specialty.

Within the rate and rating groups enlisted men progress through seven progressively higher pay grades. The first three pay grades are designed to include men from the day of recruitment to the day they become petty officers. For example, a man in the seaman general apprenticeship group would begin as a seaman recruit (pay grade E-1), then be promoted to a seaman apprentice (pay grade E-2), then to seaman (pay grade E-3; for firemen, it would be from seaman recruit (pay grade E-1, the rate of fireman recruit exists, but normally all recruits in recruit training centers are designed seaman recruit until graduation) to fireman apprentice (pay grade E-2) to fireman (pay grade E-3); etc.

The remaining four pay grades are for petty officers; third class (pay grade E-4), second class (pay grade E-5), first class (pay grade E-6), and chief petty officer (pay grade E-7). The rating of a petty officer is the combination of the rating group designation previously described and the pay grade, thus a first class petty officer in the quartermaster rating group would be designated as a quartermaster first class (QMI).

The personnel officer knows the number of persons in each rating or rate attached to each of his naval activities. He is given the rating

or rate of each man available for assignment. The complement and allowance of each naval activity is set forth in terms of so many of each rating and rate. With all this information available, the personnel officer can then use the ratings and rates as aids in placing each given man on the ship or other naval activity in the greatest need of his particular skills. The rating group and rate indicate the career field in which the man's talents lie. The pay grade indicates the degree of proficiency the man has achieved in that particular career field. To be promoted each man must demonstrate and pass competitive examinations on the skills required for the next higher pay grade in his particular rating group. The skill requirements for each rating and rate are specifically established by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.[6] Knowing the skills of each available man, the personnel officer can properly place him. The rating or rate provide this information on each man. If more specific information is required, the Navy job classifications are referred to.

Navy Job Classifications

Because of the ever-increasing need for more detailed information on each man's skills, the Navy job classifications have been developed. Each man in the Navy is assigned a primary Navy job classification and may be assigned a secondary job classification. The primary job classification shows an enlisted man's most significant skill within his rating or, in the case of personnel in the first three pay grades,

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[6] For the detailed requirements see the current edition of Manual of Qualifications for Advancement in Rating, Nav Pers 18068 (Washington: Bureau of Naval Personnel).

within his rate. The secondary job classification identifies a person's additional job skills which are significant but different from those identified by the primary job classification; it does not have to be in the field of his specialization.

The job classification is identified by the Navy Job Title and the Navy Job Code. Approximately 1,100 different jobs are classified. The job codes are identified by an alphabetic-numerical symbol or code made up of two or three letters and four digits. The letters are the alphabetical abbreviation of the rating to which the job classification is related. The four-digit number is distinctive for each job classification. A primary job code is followed by a two-digit service type code. This identifies the type of ship, station, or school where the skill was acquired. For example, the job code OM-1909-42/5313 would mean the holder was an opticalman, basic, who obtained his skill on a tender or repair ship and was a qualified second class diver (5313 is the secondary job code for a second class diver).[7]

This aid gives the personnel officer a detailed description of each man's most important skills. The ratings and rates cover broad skill requirements. The job classifications cover specific skills and are assigned by the man's commanding officer, in most cases, after demonstration of ability. The Navy Job Code as well as the rating or rate is referred to in all correspondence concerning enlisted men where placement is involved. Complements and allowances do not supplement the

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[7] The complete list of all Navy job codes, titles, and descriptions may be found in the Manual of Enlisted Navy Job Classifications, Nav Pers 15105 Revised (Washington: Bureau of Naval Personnel, November 1949).

rating or rate with job codes except in a few cases. The trend is toward the use of job codes also. The billet specifications do indicate the job code preferred.

Each man's job codes are supposed to be maintained current by his commanding officer. Certain secondary job codes are assigned by the Chief of Naval Personnel in special cases and cannot be changed without his authority. These special secondary job codes are known as the "99 series." They are used to label certain specially trained technicians the Bureau of Naval Personnel desires to keep account of. An example of such a job code would be 9910 which would designate an aviation jet engine technician specially trained in the factory and with considerable maintenance experience.

As the job classification identifies a skill, it does not imply that this skill is the person's only skill or that he is not capable of learning others. It indicates a man's most significant skills, but it is not restrictive in assignment to duty. It is used as a guide for the effective placement of personnel.

Navy Personnel Accounting

It is necessary to the success of any distribution system to have an up-to-date record of the personnel status of each command throughout the naval service. The Navy's Personnel Accounting Plan is an electric machine accounting system to provide the following:[8]

1. Complete and accurate sources for over-all planning.
2. Fiscal and statistical data.

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[8] BuPers Manual, op. cit., art. A-2102.

3. Identify activities and their allowances.

4. Identify individuals and their qualifications.

The personnel accounting machine installations (PAMI's) are located in the primary centers of naval activity. General headquarters are in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D. C. Each ship, aircraft squadron, staff, shore station, and other naval activity is known as a reporting activity and sends two reports to its designated PAMI. The first is a Personnel Accounting Card which is submitted for each man when he reports on board for duty. This contains specified information taken from the man's service record. The second report is submitted weekly and is known as the Personnel Diary. Daily changes in the status of personnel on board are noted therein in accordance with prescribed methods. When the Personnel Accounting Card is received by the PAMI an International Business Machines card known as the Personnel Status Card is punched and maintained in the files. These cards are maintained current from the personnel diary entries. These cards are the mechanical basis for the numerous monthly reports prepared by the PAMI's and sent to the Bureau of Naval Personnel, other high commands, and each reporting activity.

Two of these reports are of utmost importance to distribution officers throughout the service. These are the Activity Distribution Reports (Pers 82-31) and the Composite Strength Report (Pers 82-32) concerning each activity for which each distribution officer is responsible.

The Activity Distribution Report shows the detailed personnel status of each reporting activity. Men are arranged by rating or rate

and pay grade. The following important information on each man is listed therein:

The Name
Service Number
Rating or Rate
Accounting Category Code
Expiration of Obligated Service (Month and Year)
Primary Navy Job Classification
Secondary Navy Job Classification (if any)
Date the man was received on board
Rotation Tour Date (where rotation is involved)

The Composite Strength Report is the summary of each higher command, type commands and above. This report lists total numbers of men in each rating and rate against the command's total allowance in each of these. It also tabulates the numbers of persons in each of these ratings and rates whose enlistments expire each month in the future. The first column are the numbers of men whose enlistments will expire in the month following the month of the report and so on. The fleet commanders use the reports on each type and area command as a basis for their input and withdrawals for each of these subordinate commands. BuPers would use such reports on the fleet commands to balance their input and withdrawal. The type commanders use the reports on their own commands to determine percentages of allowance which exist and for other statistical data and plans.

By use of these reports personnel officers can have complete information monthly on the status of each of their basic teams. By comparison of the current status, potential losses, and the requirements of each basic team, the needs can be determined rapidly. As these reports are received monthly, some means are necessary to keep each basic team's status up-to-date daily as assignments and transfers occur. This problem will be discussed in more detail in later chapters as the

methods of personnel officers charged with distribution functions are described. A brief illustration of the information contained in these two fundamental reports is found on page twenty-three.

The Service Record

An enlisted man's service record is a complete history of his current enlistment. The originals are maintained in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. A copy is maintained in the duty station's files and accompanies the person when transferred to a new command. A description of the contents of this record is not necessary as it is of minor importance to a distribution officer.[9] The distribution officer for a large command does not normally have this record available when called upon to make assignment to a duty station. It is of utmost importance to the commanding officer of the ship when he makes an assignment to a specific billet on board. Most distribution officers deal with large numbers of men, therefore, the briefer coded information such as ratings or rates and job codes are used. Occasionally a man may be ordered to the flagship or command headquarters for an interview and appraisal of his service record before an assignment of special importance, but this is the exception rather than the rule.

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[9] For details refer to BuPers Manual, *op. cit.*, Chap. 2, part B.

ACTIVITY DISTRIBUTION REPORT

REPORT SYMBOL PERS 02 31

ROGERS DD 745

NAME	SERVICE NO.	RATE ABR.	ACCT'G CATEG. CODE	F	N	EXP. OBL. SER.	PRIM. NJC	SEC. NJC	DATE REPD.	ROTATION TOUR DATE
SMITH JOHN O	3856209	EMC	1000			9*2	0101	5911	13050	(1252)*
WILLIS PAUL A	2554590	EMC	1007			11*3	0101	3951	60449	
		EMC								
						1	2			
JONES ROBERT G	4750392	EM1	1000			1*2	0102		32351	
		EM1								
						2	1			
PETERS LEWIS A	7394413	EM2	1000			1*2	0102	5313	91948	
		EM2								
						3	1			
WATSON JOHN A	4536200	EM3	1000		1	1*4	0103		91150	
WAYNE ARTHUR O	2536700	EM3	1000			8*5	0103		88650	
		EM3								
						3	2		9	6

* This date is used only for shore station reports. It shows the month and the year each man's shore duty tour expires.

(This information is continued on all other rating groups)

COMPOSITE STRENGTH REPORT

REPORT SYMBOL PERS 02 32

COMCRUDESPAC

RATE CODE	RATE ABR.	ALLOW-ANCE	ON BOARD (CHARGED)	FOR ENG	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11&12	13 MOS. & OVER
0101	EMC	150	175		5	6	4	10	12	18	5	7	9	9	30	70
0102	EM1	220	215	3	7	1	4	3	20	6	4	7	10	10	18	125
0103	EM2	600	550	10	10	12	12	14	5	7	3	10	15	14	31	417
0104	EM3	820	640	10	1	4	20	3	6	10	30	20	10	9	52	475
		1790	1580	23	23	23	40	30	43	41	42	44	44	42	131	1087

(This summary is continued on all other rating groups)

PERSONNEL REPORTS AVAILABLE TO THE DISTRIBUTION AND PLACEMENT OFFICERS

CHAPTER III

DISTRIBUTION IN THE NAVY TODAY

The Principles of Naval Distribution

Distribution may be defined as the assignment of the available manpower to the various naval activities in accordance with each activity's particular needs and the long term needs of the service. The supply of manpower is limited, in peacetime, by budgets and the attraction of the naval service in the country's labor market; and in wartime, by the requirements of the other services and industry devoted to war production. Thus with a limited supply of men, the number of naval activities which can operate efficiently or effectively depends upon the Navy's training and distribution programs. As the great bulk of recruits either have no skills or civilian skills which need to be adjusted to naval needs, a training program is essential. Distribution must insure that potentialities and skills produced are utilized to the maximum advantage. In times of rapid expansion, the distribution system is under a terrific strain to provide newly constructed and reactivated ships and planes, the increase to complement of the existing basic teams, and expanding shore support facilities with the necessary manpower. Existing activities are taxed to the utmost to provide the nuclei around which men with the newly produced skills of a greatly accelerated training program can be built into effective teams.

The problem of providing the necessary manpower is met by two methods. The first is to distribute the new material, the recruits and

what civilian skills and potentialities they may possess, to those ships and other naval activities which can most efficiently utilize their services and continue their training on the job. The second method is by means of redistributing the skilled persons already in the service, if they can be spared from their present duty stations, to those basic teams which have a greater need for those skills which they possess.

All new recruits must undergo the basic training in one of the several recruit training centers. The purpose of this is two-fold. New men must be introduced to the Navy and be oriented to naval life in general. They must also be classified. Their aptitudes, skills, and abilities must be determined by tests and interviews in order that they may be assigned to the type of duty for which they are best suited. Upon the completion of the recruit training and on the basis of their classification, they might be assigned to officer training, to an advanced technical school, given a rating, selected for specialized duty, or assigned to duty in an operating unit. During the last war, roughly 40 percent of those who completed recruit training were selected for advanced schools; 10 percent were selected for special billets, immediate rating or commissioning; and the remaining 50 percent were assigned directly to ships or stations.[1] Those assigned to advanced training were distributed, upon completion, to operating units or shore activities.

Skills and abilities do not stay static. The great majority of men are continually advancing in proficiency by training, which is

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[1] Personnel Research and Test Development in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, ed. by Dewey B. Stuit, LCDR, USN (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 23.

recognized by promotion. Some are casualties of war, accident, or maladjustment. During peacetime, some are lost to civilian life. Redistribution is necessary to meet fluctuating needs, to provide promotion in position as well as in rating, and to aid morale. The fluctuating needs which must be met are expansion, shift of emphasis, technological advances, and unbalance due to heavier attrition in some activities than in others. Men who are promoted in an activity which has no vacancy in the complement or allowance must be redistributed to activities which have a vacancy, otherwise talent is wasted. In the field of morale, redistribution is necessary because of the rigors of certain types of naval duties. Every man should receive his share of shore duty if he desires. This requires a sea-shore rotation program. For various motives, men desire a change of duty periodically. This requires a program for granting such requests after a prescribed period of service if conditions permit. A periodic change of duty in peacetime also has merit in providing broad experience and training for regular personnel. Technological advances require continuous schooling in new techniques and equipment with subsequent reassignment to activities which can utilize these skills. Men must be returned to the United States for leave after long periods in the war zone. As it is usually not practical to return the ships or transport the personnel back to their previous commands, they must be reassigned to local ships, aircraft, or shore duty. This is an excellent source of personnel to form the nuclei for new ships and aircraft squadrons because of their battle experience.

Distribution in the Navy is a continuous process. All the men they have, they must use and use effectively. All they get, they must

train themselves in most cases. The new man must be distributed and trained, and the experienced men must be redistributed and trained. Training, like distribution, is a continuous process. Distribution involves the more consequential adjustments in the continuity of advancement in skill and ability whether within an activity or in school between permanent duty stations. It is the adjustment of the job to the man as his abilities increase and the man to the job as the jobs change.

A specialized phase of distribution is placement. At some point of the distribution process, which may amount to the movement of one half of the Navy's manpower strength within a given year, the skills of each individual as an individual must be matched with the specific needs of each ship or other naval activity. This is the point between the mass provision of manpower of certain specifications to the fleets or type commands and the assignment of specific duties to a given man by his commanding officer. This placement phase of distribution where each specific man is assigned and withdrawn from each specific basic team is very important. It is so crucial that the bulk of this study will be devoted to it. The highest echelon in the distribution hierarchy must provide the raw material, the necessary technical schools for training, and the co-ordination of distribution of manpower throughout the service. Other high commands must distribute this mass manpower on through the service. It is the placement phase, however, that must insure the full utilization of each specific man's skills and abilities and operate the details of the training-distribution cycle. The placement phase of distribution will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

The Bureau of Naval Personnel

The Bureau of Naval Personnel, which will be referred to hereafter as BuPers, is the central personnel agency of the Navy. It has technical control over personnel administration in the naval service. Technical control is defined as "the specialized or professional guidance and direction exercised by an authority of the Naval Establishment in technical matters."[2] BuPers legal authority over naval personnel matters is established in the U. S. Navy Regulations.[3] Under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Naval Personnel, who is the head of BuPers, formulates all basic policy and directives in personnel matters. This policy is set forth in the BuPers Manual and by orders of more temporary nature. All policy and orders issued in the name of the Chief of Naval Personnel to the naval service have the same effect and authority as if they had been signed by the Secretary of the Navy.

In the field of distribution, BuPers has many responsibilities. Through its recruiting agencies, it must procure the new men and women to maintain the Navy at the strength specified by the Personnel Allocation Plan determined by the Chief of Naval Operations. These new people must be trained in the several recruit training centers which are under the management control of BuPers. Management control is defined as "the direction exercised, in other than military matters, by an authority of the Naval Establishment over a unit of the naval establishment in the

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[2] U. S. Navy Regulations (Washington: 1948), art. 0405.

[3] Ibid., art. 0440.

administration of its local operating functions."[4] Upon completion of recruit training, BuPers distributes these recruits to the fleets, shore activities, or advanced schools dependent upon the over-all needs of the service. BuPers exercises management control over all schools except the fleet schools, assigns quotas to naval activities and the recruit training centers, establishes or approves the courses of instruction at each school, and distributes graduates, other than those sent from naval activities on returnable quotas, to the fleets and shore activities.

BuPers also controls promotion to give recognition to advanced skills by conducting Navy-wide examinations for qualified candidates and authorizing promotions for the top successful candidates in accordance with the needs of the service, and legal and budgetary limitations. BuPers controls the sea-shore rotation program. Men who have served the prescribed number of years at sea are eligible to request shore duty in the area of their choice. Lists are constructed for each rating or rate, and men are arranged on these lists in accordance with the period of time they have been at sea since their last tour of shore duty. As vacancies occur in the shore activities, fleet personnel with the greatest period of sea service in the particular rating or rate desired are ordered ashore, providing the locality of the activity is within the limits stated in the person's area preference. Personnel whose tour of shore duty has expired are distributed back to the fleets.

The receiving stations located at principal ports or centers of naval activity act as the way-stations in this constant flow of man-

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[4] Ibid., art. 0405.

power. They are attached to the naval districts, but are under the management control of BuPers. Men report to these stations for many different reasons. A few examples will serve to illustrate. Men returned to the states for leave and reassignment report to the receiving station nearest their home for reassignment. The complement of a deactivated ship may report to a designated receiving station to await its orders. Men awaiting transportation to a new station will report to a port receiving station. Men to be separated from the service will be sent to the nearest receiving station to undergo discharge procedures. These are a few of the reasons for the existence of receiving stations. It is necessary to have some center where men can be berthed and fed while awaiting orders or transportation. Each receiving station must keep BuPers continually advised as to the names and qualifications of the men awaiting assignment in order that they may be assigned as rapidly as possible.

In order to distribute the available manpower efficiently, BuPers must know the needs of the fleets and the naval districts. This information is obtained from the monthly reports of the various PAMI's. The reports relay information regarding the complements or allowances of the major commands by numbers, ratings and rates, and what they actually have, with their anticipated monthly losses. BuPers must distribute the available skills to those commands which have the greatest shortage of each particular skill available. Over-all shortages must be rectified by the Navy's training program. BuPers distributes to the two fleets and to the naval shore establishment (the bulk of these coming from the sea-shore rotation program). The diagram on page thirty-one



THE FLOW OF NAVAL PERSONNEL FROM THE SOURCES TO THE PLACEMENT LEVEL BY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES

[illegible]

illustrates the top channels of personnel distribution. Except in special cases, BuPers deals in large numbers of men with particular skills and, therefore, cannot be regarded as a placement agency.

BuPers acts as the center of manpower distribution. It must procure the necessary new recruits and must establish training programs and schools not only to prepare the new men but to assist the fleets in advancing their own training programs. It distributes mass manpower between the major centers of naval activity. It alone cannot meet the needs of the numerous naval activities without intensive training efforts by each basic team. It must co-ordinate the efforts of all concerned with the training and distribution of naval manpower to accomplish the Navy's mission.

The organization of the top echelons of BuPers is illustrated on page thirty-three. The organization of the Distribution Branch which is one of the branches of the Enlisted Personnel Division is illustrated on page thirty-four. The Detail Section is an important agency in the control of the movement of the Navy's manpower.

Distribution by the Fleet Commanders

The Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets are responsible for personnel administration within their respective commands in accordance with the directives of BuPers and within the limits of authority delegated to them. The Commander, Service Force in each fleet is responsible for the logistics support of the fleet. As such, he is delegated the authority and responsibility for the provision of personnel to the fleet. The fleet commander establishes


The Chief of Naval Personnel
Administrative Assistants
The Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel
Administrative Assistants
Assistant Chiefs for-
Plans
Personnel Control
Educational Training
Naval Reserve
Records
Legislation and Liaison with Other Agencies
Welfare
Finance and Property Management
Chief of Chaplains
Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Personnel Control
Divisions
Officer Personnel
Enlisted Personnel
Personnel Transportation
Retirement
Medals and Awards
Recruiting

THE ORGANIZATION OF TOP ECHELONS IN THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL


Distribution Branch of the Division of Enlisted Personnel
Detailing Section
Aviation Policy and Distribution Control
Sea and Shore Detail Policy
Detail Control Officer
Projects Detail Officer
Statistics Officer
Wave and Naval Reserve Detailing
Shore Detailing
Aviation Detailing
Fleet Detailing
Shore Duty Eligibility List
Humanitarians - Embassies and Missions
School Assignments Section
Classification Section
Receiving Station Section
Services Section

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DISTRIBUTION BRANCH OF THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL WITH EMPHASIS ON THE DETAILING SECTION WHICH CONTROLS THE FLOW OF MANPOWER WITHIN THE NAVAL SERVICE

fundamental policies, but the details of execution are the responsibility of the fleet's service force commander. The fleet personnel officer is assigned the Service Force Commander's staff. BuPers does not exercise functional control over the fleet personnel officers. However, the fleet personnel officer is responsible to the fleet's service force commander who is in turn responsible to the fleet commander that BuPers policies and directives are carried out. In the name of the fleet commander or the service force commander, depending on the policy to be promulgated, the fleet personnel officer issues such directives to the fleet and the type and area commanders as may be necessary to carry out the discretion granted by BuPers in personnel matters. Navy-wide directives of BuPers are binding on all naval activities unless they are specifically exempted. It is not necessary for commanders in the chain of command to reissue them to their subordinate commands. The fleet commanders may amplify BuPers directives within their own fleets as far as they feel necessary provided they comply with the intent of these directives.

The fleet personnel officers distribute the men made available to them by making them available to their type and area commanders. By the use of the monthly PAMI reports (the Composite Strength Reports) concerning their subordinate commands, the fleet personnel officer maintains statistics on the strength of each of these subordinate commands. By comparing the on-board count of each rating and rate with the complement or allowance (whichever is in effect), the shortages in each subordinate command can be determined. The available manpower can then be made available to that type or area commander who has the greatest

need for each particular skill.

A special situation exists in the Pacific Fleet, due to the distance between Pearl Harbor, T. H., where the fleet and service force commanders are located, and the continental U.S.A. The Commander, Western Sea Frontier, located in San Francisco, acts as the West Coast distribution representative of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. His central location in relation to continental shore activities, the majority of the type commanders, and centers of embarkation reduces the communication problem considerably. As Commander, Service Force, Atlantic Fleet is located in the continental U.S.A., this problem does not exist in the Atlantic Fleet. The Commander, Western Sea Frontier, under the control of the fleet commander through the fleet personnel officer, distributes the manpower made available to the Pacific Fleet to the various type and area commanders of the fleet in accordance with their needs.

Intrafleet redistribution is accomplished by the fleet personnel officer. Redistribution may be resorted to in order to balance personnel shortages which may develop in any one of the subordinate commands if the input of personnel from outside sources does not suffice. A forward area rotation program between ship and shore duty is conducted by the fleet commanders to permit men attached to the sea commands to request and be assigned to an area command ashore after meeting certain requirements. The men accepted are then made available to the commander of the area of their choice for assignment to one of his shore activities. This is the primary source of manpower for the forward area shore activities. The balance is made up from their share of the available

men from sources outside the fleet. A similar program exists in the fleet's shore billets in the continental U.S.A. Personnel attached to sea commands may also request transfers within their command to other units of the fleet not under their present type commander. These requests are sent to the service force commander. The granting of such requests is dependent on the endorsement of the type commanders concerned and the geographical proximity of the two ships or aircraft squadrons involved.

In times of naval expansion, the fleet commanders may be required to maintain pre-commissioning centers for the assembly of crews for ships being constructed or re-commissioned. The nucleus of crews must be procured from experienced men from the ships of the fleet. The balance of the crews is assigned from manpower made available to the fleet from BuPers. Men of the fleet may request such duty if they can fulfill established requirements. Their withdrawal from the active units of the fleet will depend on whether or not they can be spared and on the needs of the pre-commissiong centers. The men ordered to these centers are formed into balanced crews shortly before the new ships are commissioned.

The Fleet Personnel Officer must administer the BuPers school quotas assigned to the fleet. Some may be mandatory, if a great need exists in the Navy. These, he must apportion equitably to the subordinate commands of the fleet. Some men who are sent to the BuPers administered schools are returnable to their original teams and some are not. Quotas which are optional, he assigns to those ships or other fleet activities which submit requests. Service Force letters inform

the fleet on what schools are available. The fleets also maintain their own schools. These are directed by the fleet training command whose commander may be regarded as a type commander. Quotas in such fleet schools are available upon request to the local training command activity or in some cases to the school itself. The fleet schools are maintained to supply the fleet with facilities for special training needed in shipboard billets. They devote much time to training the subteams of the ships and aircraft as units. Ships usually utilize these schools when they are going to be in port for the necessary period of time. All these schools provide a means of increasing the skills of the Navy's manpower and are very important to the distribution cycle.

The fleet commands represent the second echelon in the chain of distribution responsibility. They distribute the manpower made available to them to their type and area commanders, in accordance with their needs, for further distribution. They deal with large numbers of men but are one step closer to placement. In a few cases where special qualifications are involved, they may actually assign persons by name to a basic team. This is the exception however and is always subject to the concurrence of the type or area commander concerned. They are also responsible for insuring that adequate training programs are pursued within the fleets for the advancement of men in skills to meet existing needs. They are not only responsible for the effective distribution of the skills available to the fleet but for keeping BuPers informed of the present and ever-changing needs of the fleets in order that distribution and training programs may be adjusted to meet these needs.

CHAPTER IV

PLACEMENT IN THE NAVY TODAY

The Principles of Naval Placement

Placement is the end phase of distribution. It is the assignment of individuals to specific basic teams in the light of the needs of those teams and the qualifications of the available men. Assignment of groups of individuals with no skill or marked potentiality may be included, but the assignment must be to a specific basic team to be considered "placement." BuPers and the fleet commanders distribute mas aggregates of manpower on the basis of filling type command and area command complements or allowances of specific ratings or rates. It is the type or area commander's personnel officer who places each of the individuals of these groups as individuals in a specific basic team to meet a particular existing or future need.

Under certain circumstances job codes may be used in the bulk distribution of BuPers and the fleet commanders. This is common in ratings which are a combination of several basic skills or in the very technical skills. An example of the former would be the ship serviceman rating which includes such skills and special job codes as store operators, barbers, beauticians, tailors, laundrymen and dry cleaners, and cobblers. In the case of very technical skills, distribution by BuPers and the fleet commands may approach placement, as the number of basic teams which would require an advanced technician may be severely limited, but it never quite reaches placement due to the position of the type or area commander

in the distribution chain. In other words, the higher distribution agencies provide the broader skills, potentialities, or unskilled manpower to meet over-all needs. The provision of a specific Navy skill for a specific job is the problem of placement. This may be accomplished by specific assignment of available skilled men or by assignment of men with potentialities who can be adjusted to the existing needs by further training under the basic team's training program.

In redistribution, higher commands are primarily concerned with filling quotas in the schooling and general rotation programs. The type and area commanders are more concerned with maintaining their ships, aircraft squadrons, and shore stations in balance, filling existing shortages in the basic teams, replacing losses which the team cannot replace by reshuffling those already assigned, and insuring the necessary on-board training and use of technical schools for present and future requirements of each team. The basic team is the focal point of training for specific needs and each must pursue an efficient training program of its own, in addition to utilizing existing schools as much as possible. Nevertheless, the speed of training cannot always keep up with losses. Where this situation arises, the type or area commander must take steps to correct it, or he will have an inoperative ship or ineffective station on his hands.

Placement with all of its ramifications is the primary function of the type or area commander's personnel officer. It is this officer who must assign in the name of the type or area commander, John Jones, Interior Communications Electrician Second Class, qualified to repair gyro compasses, to that specific basic team in the type or area command

which is in the greatest need of his talents. The specificity of placement varies directly with the degree of proficiency of the skill possessed by the man to be assigned or reassigned. There is a considerable difference between assigning John Jones, previously described, and Bill Smith, seaman apprentice, who has no special skills and no known potentialities. Unskilled recruits may be assigned to basic teams in groups. No ship can use 100 percent skilled men at any given time efficiently as approximately 40 percent of its billets call for abilities which can be learned in a relatively short period of time on board. Some members of the crew must scrub the decks, clean the compartments, carry the ammunition, and perform many such menial duties. This would hold true in varying degrees for shore stations. A skilled person would quickly become frustrated by being required to devote a large portion of his time to menial duties. However, the persons performing these duties must be in constant training for higher skills to meet future needs. Most experienced officers agree that petty officers should have had general duty experience during the beginning of their careers. This is one of the more logical arguments presented against sending persons directly to advanced schools after recruit training and also against rating persons who have had no sea experience. The distribution program should insure that all men are given the necessary basic experience important to future advancement.

Placement is not perfect, as there are human and measurement limitations. It has not progressed to the stage where each person can be assigned to a definite billet on each team. The commanding officers of the basic teams still have discretion in assigning specific duties

to each man, limited only by the requirement that he utilize the skills that are provided in an efficient manner. With a limited supply of skilled men, such persons must be used efficiently. If they are not, the whole service suffers along with the basic team. Efficient utilization of skilled men is one of the factors in rating the efficiency of team commanders. When they are hoarding skilled men needed elsewhere, they can be withdrawn for use in a situation where their skills are needed and will be used.

It is firmly believed that the discretion in duty assignment should never be taken from the commanding officers. They are responsible for the performance of their team. They alone, assisted by their officers and petty officers, are in a position to observe each man as an interactive force on the team. It will be some time before adequate measurements of aptitudes and personalities are developed so that placement can be perfect. In other words, so that the shape and dimensions of each billet is known and the skill and personality of each man is known so that they can be matched perfectly. If placement were perfect, it would in effect be extreme. Under present limitations, it would seem ideal to establish large pools of manpower in various localities with a sufficient supply of all skills, aptitudes, and personality traits which could be desired. Then the commanding officers could pick those persons who have the qualifications required to fill each vacant billet in each specific team. However, this is impossible due to the limited supply and a widely dispersed force. The most practical substitute is the most efficient placement system which can be devised under the existing limitations.

Naval duties are not restricted to the occupations set forth in

the rating structure. Many general quarters stations, for example, may not be directly related to a person's normal occupation. The chief yoeman may make the best telephone talker for the bridge, or a seaman apprentice may make the best director-trainer. These special stations may have many factors which are related only indirectly to a special skill found among the Navy's formal occupations. They are more likely to be related to particular human traits found in the personalities of certain people. The assignment of persons to special billets, such as general quarters, which are performed only a small part of the time is best accomplished by the commanding officer, assisted by his officers and petty officers, as they are in a position to observe performance daily and under all conditions.

This also holds for the assignment of duties to the unskilled and persons with minor skills. They will work into a position on the team in accordance with the abilities they demonstrate. Their personalities are also a major factor which ~~a distribution officer~~ they themselves cannot be in a position to know. For these reasons, placement cannot be more specific than it is at present, at least not until more adequate devices to measure the aptitute and personality factors can be established. Unskilled persons are assigned to ships or stations in accordance with their needs for raw manpower. As they acquire skills, as a result of in-service or on-the-job training and experience, the qualification codes which will be assigned to them will give the type or area commander's personnel officer responsible for placement and transfer more adequate information so that later assignments can be more specific.

Thus, placement is the function of fitting mass manpower into the

specific basic teams which are in the greatest need of each man's particular qualifications. The complements and allowances establish the requirements of each basic team. These are the skills or mere manpower required in normal operation. The skills of the men available for assignment are indicated by the ratings, rates, and job codes. These the placement officer can match. The special abilities, personalities required for special conditions such as general quarters, and the specific use of unskilled manpower is determined by each commanding officer. Placement as it exists today provides the general skills or aptitudes and in the case of higher petty officers the specific skills. In other words, placement fills those needs which can be codified in the rating structure and job codes, plus the unskilled manpower in the numbers required. The greater the degree of skill required the more specific placement can become. Placement exists to assist the basic teams in meeting these personnel needs by two primary means. The first is scientific assignment of the personnel made available from sources outside the type or area command. The second is careful reassignment of personnel within the command. Both are necessary and each tends in some degree to remedy the deficiencies of the other. Existing basic teams become out of balance due to numerous factors. The balance must be maintained by placement. Crews must be provided for the newly formed basic teams. This, also, is the problem of placement.

In a later section, the functions of the type commander in the field of placement will be discussed. The functions of the area commander are very similar. It is believed that their problems are less pressing in this subject at present due to the lack of wide dispersion of forces

and lack of their mobility, the lesser dependence on any sub-team, and the fact that distribution programs appear to be set up to favor their needs. During peacetime, only personnel with sufficient time remaining in their current enlistment to complete the required period of duty in the area are assigned to them. This advantage is cancelled out in wartime due to the fact all personnel are retained in service throughout the war.

The Pre-commissioning Centers

The pre-commissioning centers which exist during periods of naval expansion demonstrate the closest approach to the idea of perfect placement. At these centers balanced teams are formed for each ship about to be commissioned. The advantage lies in the fact that each potential member of each team is physically available for the personal assessment of his skills, special abilities, and personality. Additional aptitude tests and personal interviews are possible, and each individual can be fitted to a specific billet and special station with scientific precision before the ship must become a working unit of the fleet.

This type of placement activity existed during the last war. They were located at or near the principal ship building centers. Their purpose was to organize and train the larger part of the crews for the new ships. The placement function was carried on by the classification activity within each center. New men were classified and assigned to the ships' crews in accordance with need. These classification activities performed three primary functions: (1) to provide balanced crews for the new ships, (2) to insure proper utilization of each man's skills and abilities, and (3) to assist the ship's officers to establish

efficient personnel administration within their commands. Theoretically the objective was to match the man and the job perfectly. In practice this objective could not be met perfectly. The best was done with the personnel provided by higher commands. After the objective was achieved as far as physically possible, the remainder of the balancing process was used to insure that each ship received its share of the well qualified and poorly qualified men available. The centers informed the higher distribution agencies as to the needs of the various crews, that is the formal naval skills required as could be determined by the Navy's rating and job code system. The principal defects of the actual methods these centers operated under were as follows:[1]

1. ". . . the lack of knowledge of qualifications of key members of the crews, who were usually sent to the yard where the ship was being built rather than to the pre-commissioning center. . . ."

2. ". . . lack of specific complement and billet data required in order to assign men properly. . . ."

3. ". . . and inadequacy of time permitted for classification and assignment of the crew which precluded the 'pooling' of men with special abilities and qualifications."

Theoretically if more time had been available, these centers could have made readjustments in the original assignments during the training phase after the organization of the crews. This was done in a few cases.

One of the earliest scientific approaches (and an interesting one)

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[1] Personnel Research and Test Development in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, ed. by Dewey B. Stuit, LCDR, USNR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 25.

to the problem of adequate classification and placement in a new crew was the "New Jersey Experiment" conducted in March 1943 at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, under the direction of Commander (now Captain) P. E. McDowell, USN, who at that time had been assigned as Executive Officer of the U.S.S. New Jersey, which was soon to be commissioned.[2]

> The plan, to sum it up briefly, called for the preparation of billet specifications, followed by the selection of the individual to fill each billet prior to the date of commission. Roughly, 2,400 men were screened. The mechanics of screening consisted of administering the standard bureau battery a test battery , then a research stage, the NDRC Personnel Inventory and the National Research Council parallel test, a 20-minute interview of each man, followed by a recommendation for his assignment. Additional tests for practical aptitudes were given, consisting principally of the telephone talker test, measuring ability to hear and speak over telephones, together with a measure of memory span, a test of night vision, and the visual test for prospective rangefinder operators and spotters which was given by the Army Anti-Aircraft Training Command at Richmond through one of their mobile units sent to Philadelphia.
>
> The organization to permit handling personnel at the rate of 2,400 in 30 days consisted of a screening unit composed of Bureau personnel and ship's company, mostly enlisted men with a few officer supervisors. This group administered the tests one day and filled in the necessary forms that night in order that the interviewer might have all data available the following day at the time of the interview. As a result of tests and interview, the individual was recommended for an assignment and moved on to the Department Personnel Officer, who reviewed the test results, considered the interview and the recommendation, and either accepted or rejected the individual man. If accepted, the man reported to his Division Personnel Officer, and at this point was again considered and accepted or rejected for assignment. If accepted by both Department and Division Personnel Officer, he was entered on the muster roll and watch quarter and station bills. If rejected by either the Department or Division Personnel Officer, he was returned to the Classification Center, where his case was considered, and a second recommendation was made. If an individual was rejected three times, his case was presented to the Executive Officer.

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[2] Captain P. E. McDowell, USN, "Practical Application of Classification Afloat," Proceedings of the Personnel Officers Conference, 1949 (Washington: Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1949), pp. 5-6.

> By this procedure, the total of 2,400 men were ultimately placed, while 26 were rejected for all assignments aboard ship. Of these 26, 14 had been institutional cases at one time or another and were turned over to the doctors for separation from the service. 11 were separated. Those rejected by the ship but retained in the Navy were returned to the Receiving Station with a flat statement that they would not be accepted on board.

The "New Jersey Experiment" represents an exception rather than the rule in new ship commissioning personnel practices. It is an example of what can be done in a pre-commissioning center, if proper information is available about the billets and adequate classification is used. It should be mentioned that ample men and a special status were afforded for this experiment. The possibilities of this specialized type of placement are great, providing the defects of World War II's personnel system are eliminated. Proper job specifications for each billet on all types of ships and other naval activities will soon be an accomplished fact. The basic problems which remain will be in the classification of individuals and the provision of the type of crews required. Adequate time must be allowed, and all potential members of the crew must be assembled in one center. Close co-ordination with distribution activities will be mandatory. A closely controlled system, such as this, would not work for ships already in operation, due to their wide geographic dispersion, but some of the basic ideas of centralization might have possibilities. With well balanced basic teams on the ships going in commission, the problems of the type commanders are materially reduced. The question would then be the maintenance of these teams, while losses take their toll. The idea of pre-commissioning centers presents, at least theoretically, the possibility of perfect placement. Placement is less perfect for the type and area commanders to accomplish due to the physical dispersion of their basic

teams and the volume of manpower they must assign and be responsible for.

The Type Commander

The type commanders are responsible to the fleet commander for the administration of the ships within their command. For the Commander, Air Forces in the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets, this includes aircraft squadrons. In the distribution of personnel, they are responsible for the placement phase, insofar as it affects their respective commands. On the staff of each type commander is a personnel officer who, in the name of the type commander, executes the placement function. The number of assistants this personnel officer may have vary with the size of the command. In effect, in the large staffs, it may be one of these assistants who executes the placement function or a combination of assistants under the broad plans formulated by the personnel officer. When the performance of the type commander is referred to in this section, the reader must realize it is the personnel officer or assistant personnel officers on the staff who are actually executing the function, in the type commanders name and under his general or, in some cases, specific policies.

In the placement of personnel the responsibilities of the type commander are several. First, he must place those persons made available to him for assignment by the fleet commander in one of his basic teams in accordance with need. Second, he must redistribute those persons within the type command so as to maintain a balance between his basic teams and insure the full utilization of each skill available. Redistribution must be exercised with caution as will be explained later. Third, he must keep the fleet commander informed as to those needs which cannot be satisfied within the command. Fourth, he must insure that each of his basic teams

is pursuing an effective training program including utilization of the Navy's schools as far as practicable. Fifth, he must provide for intra-type movement of personnel for morale reasons. Besides the placement function, he is also responsible for all other phases of personnel administration within the command.

Reports are received from the fleet personnel officer (in the name of the service force commander) when personnel are available for assignment by teletype, radio, or letter. The type commander then determines the specific assignment and sends this by like means of communication to the command where the man is presently attached. Each availability report contains the following information on each man to be assigned: the name, service number, rating or rate, primary job code, secondary job code (if any), and the date of expiration of the current enlistment (not a factor in times of emergency). Groups of men in the first three pay grades may be reported by numbers only if their qualifications are identical. They then are assigned by numbers to each of the basic teams requiring their services. All men are retained at their previous duty station until specific assignment is received by the commanding officer of this previous duty station from the type commander. Transportation then commences to the new duty station. Leave may or may not be granted while in transit, depending on the circumstances. In many cases, leave has been taken prior to being made available for assignment. Where men are being transferred from a shore activity, they are retained on the job or at some job until their transportation begins. When they are made available from a receiving station they remain unproductive at the station until this transportation begins. This latter case is not desirable, but under many circumstances,

cannot be helped. Such transfers are known as "straight line transfers." This is illustrated on page fifty-two.[3] As can be seen the advantage lies in the fact that in the majority of cases, the man remains productive until his transportation is begun; and the fact that he goes directly to his new duty station without the loss of man hours of productivity while waiting in assignment pools along the way. The morale advantage besides the insecurity in pools is the fact his family can receive immediate transportation to the new home port with the man accompanying them. In brief, administrative delays have less effect on productivity of manpower, and morale is protected. Unfortunately, the "straight line transfer" is not always used, and men do accumulate in receiving stations while awaiting orders.

In many cases, men have to be reassigned within the type command. Because basic teams lose and train men in new skills at different rates, men made available from outside may not be sufficient to maintain a proper balance among the various basic teams in the type command. In such cases, men may have to be reassigned from one team to another. There are other reasons for such transfers, such as providing nucleus crews for new ships and improving individual morale. It must be emphasized, however, that reassignment, if not done carefully, may do basic teams more harm than good. It takes a great deal of time and patience to build an effective team, and the constant breaking up of teams and the continued movement of personnel lessen the effectiveness of all teams, lower morale, and cause

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[3] Captain W. O. Burch, Jr., USN, "Enlisted Distribution," Proceedings of the Personnel Officers Conference, 1949 (Washington: Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1949), p. 53.



Administration via radio, teletype, or letter.

——— Available

— — — Orders

Physical movement of personnel.

═══ Person travels directly to new duty station

THE STRAIGHT LINE TRANSFER

frustration on the part of those who are trying to build good teams. Men do not like the uncertainty of continual movement. They want to feel that they belong to a team, and that the hard work required bo build the team will receive recognition. The following cases are typical of those which require reassignment within the type command.

1. Men sent to advanced schools because of their qualifications may have to be reassigned to another team upon graduation due to the fact their previous team cannot use their new qualifications efficiently. This is necessary to prevent wasting new and higher skills.

2. Where a man has served a certain period of time at sea, it should be made possible for him to request shore duty or transfer to another team. Such movement is good for morale and broadens experience. It is also good for the teams as it permits a slow influx of new blood and new ideas. However the turnover in any one team should be slow. Movement within the type command can be controlled by the type commander in many cases.

3. Certain cases exist where the type commander has little control over planned and systematic movement. One of these is the unexpected loss of key personnel and large numbers of men in the lower pay grades by order of higher command. These persons are withdrawn from the type command as a result of the rotation and school programs and for other naval activities outside the type command. Little planning is possible for the replacement of these losses due to the lack of advance notice given. Therefore, if the basic teams do not have sufficient trained men available to replace their losses, they must be furnished from another source. The input from sources outside of the type command

does not always help at the moment as the type of qualifications of the men available are not co-ordinated with the qualifications of the men withdrawn. The only alternative available to the type commander is to transfer the required qualified men from another basic team in the type command to replace the loss.

4. Another situation which may necessitate reassignment occurs during peacetime, when conditions are good in industry. Heavy losses are continually plaguing the teams due to men leaving the service upon completion of their enlistments to earn greater pay in civilian life. At any time the shortage of any rating in the fleet is nearly proportional to the demand of that skill in industry. Some teams cannot train new skills fast enough to replace their losses. The only alternative, where the situation becomes serious, is to reassign men from other teams which have been able to train a few more men than were required to replace their own losses. This is not a good procedure, but where input from outside sources is not sufficient, there is no other solution, except to deactivate basic teams. This usually is not permitted.

5. Hospitalization and causalties take their toll of the team's members, but except where losses are high, such as might exist during wartime, the basic team's training program can replace such losses in most cases. In the highly skilled pay grades, this is not always possible, because of the many years of technical training required. Hence, transfer or requisition to higher echelons is required.

6. Another factor mentioned earlier is advancement in position as well as in rating. A person who is promoted in a basic team which has

no vacancy is wasted talent. He also presents a morale problem. In all fairness to the man and to the service, he should be moved to another team which does have a vacancy in the position in which he is qualified and which needs him. Such a problem may also be solved by moving someone else who desires a new duty assignment to make room for the newly promoted man in his own team. The fact that a person wants to be challenged by his job and to feel that some team is in need of him provides the justification for such a move.

7. Other miscellaneous cases for reassignment may exist. Some of these are personal in nature. Persistent malcontents should not be transferred to other teams, to become a burden on them. A person who cannot be salvaged to become a co-operative and productive member of some team should be separated from the service.

The type commander cannot rely exclusively upon the Activity Distribution Reports in determining the needs of his basic teams. These reports are received from the PAMI's only once a month, and when they are received, they are at least a week behind the actual status of the basic teams. They do serve as a foundation for establishing each team's needs, but they must be supplemented by some system of daily accounting within the personnel office. There is no standardized method of maintaining internal accounting systems among the type and area commands of the Navy. Each command adopts whatever system seems to meet its needs. The systems in existence vary from excellent to unsatisfactory. Some type and area commanders use elaborate display boards, others use paper charts, and some merely thumb through the activity distribution reports, whenever a man is available for assignment. The problem is to maintain whatever type of

information is used up-to-the-minute. In other words, the information presented must reflect the on-board status, corrected up to the last person ordered to a particular basic team and the latest known loss. Anticipated losses must also be taken into consideration. While personnel officer for the Commander, Cruisers-Destroyers, Pacific Fleet, the author developed a system which proved its worth in actual operations. This system is still used in that type command. Information received recently from officers on the staff indicated that the system proved to be one of the most efficient in the type commands of the Pacific Fleet during the rapid expansion of the Korean War. The fundamentals of this system will be described in the next section of this chapter.

An Internal Personnel Control System for Type Commanders

Any system of personnel control within a type command must be based on the Navy's Personnel Accounting Plan as it is the standardized basis of naval personnel control throughout the service, and the necessary information is readily available. The instruments available are the Activity Distribution Reports, the Composite Strength Reports, display boards, weekly copies of the Personnel Diaries, assignments made, copies of orders to members of the basic teams from higher commands, monthly anticipated loss reports from basic teams, letters from the teams' commanding officers, and conferences with representatives of the teams. The objective of the system devised by the author was the presentation in a concise and visual form of the up-to-the-minute status and needs of each ship and staff of CruDesPac. This information was used to assign the persons made available to the Type Commander, to maintain a balance of personnel on the ships and staffs of the Type Command, and to withdraw

men of the desired qualifications for various commitments.

The system operated under the most severe conditions for the control of over twenty thousand men assigned to more than eighty-five ships and staffs. On peak days, approximately six hundred men were assigned to the basic teams. The issuance of orders to members of the basic teams to satisfy requirements imposed by higher authority and intra-type transfers added to this figure. The basic teams ranged in size from a destroyer division commander's allowance of three men to a heavy cruiser's allowance of over one thousand men.

The status and needs of each of these basic teams were displayed on five Produc-trol Boards.[4] A picture of such a board is displayed on page fifty-eight. Each of the four large boards is 43½ inches wide and 39 inches high. The one small board used is 22½ inches wide and 39 inches high. The large board has 40,000 small holes imposed in its rectangular surface, the small board 20,000 holes. On the left side of each board is a mounted Kardex with 100 card holders. Small ivory finish pegs of various shapes and colors, some with numerals, were fitted into the small holes in each board to indicate allowances, on-board status, requirements, men in transit to these basic teams, and special qualifications for each rating and each ship or staff.

Each basic team was assigned a vertical column of five rows of holes, known as the column. Each rating and rate was assigned two horizontal rows of holes, known as the file. The rating groups and rate groups were separated by white strings which originated on the left side of the board

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[4] Produced by the Wassell Organization, Westport, Connecticut.

ILLUSTRATION OF A STANDARD 100 ITEM PRODUC-TROL BOARD



A.— VISIBLE RECORD PANEL — Holds 100 Record Cards, controls 100 items.

B.— PEG HOLE SECTION — There are two horizontal rows of 200 peg-holes for each Record Card.

C.— HEADING STRIP — Replaceable card strip calibrated in "Time" and/or "Quantity" values or other designated factors.

D.— SIGNAL PEGS — Inserted in peg-holes to indicate "Time" and/or "Quantity" values or other designated factors. Available in various shapes and colors.

E.— "PROGRESS" TAPE PEG — A Horizontal flow line that indicates progress against any planned schedule.

F.— "TODAY" LINE — A colored Vertical Cord that is advanced daily to show current date.

G.— VERTICAL CORDS — Used to separate peg-hole section into "Time" and/or "Quantity" divisions or other designated factors.

H.— LEGEND CARD — Shows what the various colors and shapes of pegs represent.

and were attached to an internal spring which allowed them to be pulled horizontally across the board and remain taut. The pegs located in the first two vertical rows of holes in each column represented the numbers of persons in each rating actually on board each team. These numbers were indicated by white pegs with black numerals imposed therein. These figures were obtained by correcting the latest Activity Distribution Reports with those personnel diaries received since the date of each report. The result was the actual on-board count in each rating and rate as of the date of the last personnel diary received. Copies of these personnel diaries were required by the type commander each week, with certain additional information written in by pen and ink. The third vertical row was used to signal special information on the qualification of men in those ratings where necessary. Various colored signal pegs were used for this purpose. The fourth and fifth vertical rows of holes in each column were used to indicate the number of persons in each rating or rate ordered, in transit, but not yet reported as on board by the personnel diaries. Thus, the total of the first-second rows and the fourth-fifth rows subtracted from the allowance would give the shortage below allowance, as far as the control situation was concerned. More detailed information on each man, ordered and in transit, could be found in one of the Kardex cards. One card was maintained for each ship and each staff. When a person was ordered to the ship or staff, the date the order was issued, his rating or rate, job codes, where ordered from, and the reference to the order in the files were entered on the card of that ship or staff. These cards were continually checked and when each man reported on board for duty, as indicated by the team's personnel diary, the date of reporting was recorded on the card as the

last entry concerning that individual. At that time each man's name and all other information from the personnel diary was written into the latest Activity Distribution Report of the particular team to which he reported in the proper place, the fourth-fifth row of the team was reduced by one in the particular rating, and the first-second row increased by one. The numbers in-transit in the fourth-fifth rows were indicated by green pegs with black numerals imposed therein. The in-transit number was differently presented for men who had no rating designation and were in the first three pay grades. This will be described later in this section. Men ordered from basic teams were indicated on the display boards merely by reducing the on-board count of the particular rating or rate by one. Entry was made opposite the man's name in the Activity Distribution Report as to where he had been ordered. If it was an intra-type transfer, then the regular procedure would be carried out for the team to which he had been ordered as previously described. Legends were affixed to each board for interpreting the meaning of the numerous colored pegs used for the aid of those not familiar with the system.

Each rating group was allocated seven files. The top five indicated pay grades 7, 6, 5, 4 and designated non-rated personnel of that rating group. For example, a firecontrol technician seaman (FTSN) would be located in the fifth file from the top in the seven files allocated to the firecontrol technician rating group. This is illustrated in the example on page sixty-five. The bottom two files of the seven are used to indicate priorities of need. The uppermost of these two files is used to indicate the need for masters in the rating skill, the lower for journeymen. In most cases, the master skills in each rating group were composed of persons in pay grades 7 and 6, the journeyman skills of

persons in pay grades 5, 4, and designated non-rated personnel of the rating group. In rating groups which had a low percentage of allowance in the upper pay grades, the master skills also included those of pay grade 5 (second class petty officers). These groups, master and journeyman, were used as a guide for placement, as will be seen later.

In order to determine need, the number of people in each rating or rate were not compared directly with the allowance. Because of the wide variance in percentage of the allowance the type command had in different ratings and the variety of types of ships and staffs in the type command, each type with a different allowance, a figure known as the "base figure" was used to compare on-board count with. The "base figure" was determined by multiplying the team's allowance in any rating by a percentage (the base percentage) slightly higher than the type command's percentage of allowance currently existing in that rating. In many cases the "base figure" was the allowance, or greater than the allowance if a surplus existed in a given rating. The advantage lay in the fact the "base figure" could be adjusted to meet the particular situation. It proved a flexible standard by which all ships and staffs could be compared equally. In ratings which were below allowance a destroyer with a small allowance in ratings would be at a disadvantage if the priority designator was the allowance minus the on-board count when compared with a cruiser with a greater allowance. An example will be shown.

Case I

Allowance used in a rating with a shortage of 50%.

Destroyer allowance of masters in rating X - 2

Cruiser allowance of masters in rating X - 12

Destroyer on-board count - 0

Cruiser on-board count - 8

Destroyer priority designator - 2

Cruiser priority designator - 4

In Case I attention would be directed to the cruiser when a master of rate X was available when in reality the destroyer was in dire need and the cruiser had more than its share.

Case II

The base percentage of 50 percent used with a shortage of 50 percent, using the same allowance and on-board count as in Case I. (Apply 50% to the allowance in Case I to determine the base figure).

Destroyer priority designator - 1

Cruiser priority designator - 0

In this case the personnel officer's attention is directed to the destroyer and not the cruiser.

It is realized that the use of daily adjusted percentages rather than a base figure would be more accurate, but the time involved in continual computation would present a difficult problem. The base percentage was usually maintained slightly higher than the type percentage of allowance in any given rating group. This would permit an ample number of priority designator pegs on the boards to place rapidly any above average number of men in a given rating if received. For example, if the number of master electricians mates actually in the type command was 200 and the allowance was 300, the percentage of allowance would be 66. The base percentage would probably be set at the beginning of the month at 70 percent. This would permit a gain of 10 such men during the month and

as this would be the maximum possible to expect, there would be a sufficient number of priority designator pegs to assign this gain without reworking all the figures. The base was adjusted once each month by the personnel officer. The limiting factor on setting the base too high above the actual percentage of allowance is the advantage of the larger ships increases as the difference increases.

These priority designators are indicated by use of red pegs with black numerals imposed therein. It is a rapid means of drawing attention to teams with the greatest actual needs. When a person was available for assignment, one had only to run his eye across the boards in the particular file and attention was quickly directed to that team with the highest number. This meant the greatest need. The priority designator only served as a guide, however. The rating structure also was studied along with the person's job code. The priority designators quickly singles out those teams with the greatest need for more careful study before actual placement of men available to assign.

Future losses also had to be taken into account. These were represented by yellow pegs with black numerals imposed therein and were placed alongside the red priority designator. An example of this will be described below.

When a person was assigned to a ship, for example, the priority designator, red, if there are any, then yellow, would be reduced by one and the in-transit rows (fourth-fifth) of the column increased by one. The simplicity of this method permitted any experienced person in the personnel office to make efficient assignments.

Enlisted personnel in pay grades one through three who were not

designated in one of the rating groups were lumped together in the general rate groups. For example, all seamen, seaman apprentice, and seaman recruits were lumped together in the seaman group. The same was done for firemen. In each basic team's column, each of these groups had three files. The top file indicated the on-board count. The third file indicated the number of in-transits. The second was used for any special information desired. The priority designators which controlled input into each basic team in these first three pay grades was the total on-board count plus in-transits found in the last file of each team on the last board. This number was kept up-to-date as people were ordered in and out. A base was not used as it was easy to memorize the over-all allowances of each type of team and figure percentages in ones head. These again were used as a guide. Firemen, for example, were not given to teams which had a low over-all count but which had ample firemen. The relationship of each group to its allowance was considered in each case before placement was made.

A portion of a display board is illustrated on page sixty-five. The example presented in the title column, the allowance column, and the status column of the U.S.S. Able (a hypothetical destroyer). The example illustrates the files for the boatswain's mate rating group (BM), the quartermaster rating group (QM), the seaman rate group, and the over-all totals. This information is continued horizontally for all ships and staffs in the type command with an allowance column preceeding each different type of ship and staff. The rating and rate groups are continued vertically for all ratings and rates in the type command. Staffs are usually presented separately as there are few rating and rate groups involved. The destroyer allowance in boatswain's mates is one



		DD Allow.	U.S.S. Able
BM	C	1	1
	1	1	1
	2	2	2
	3	3	
	S		1
	M		1 1
	J		2
QM	C	1	1
	1	2	1
	2	1	
	3	2	1
	S		1
	M		
	J		1 1
RD	C		
S	OB	7 2	5 8
	TR		5
TOTAL		5	1 4

A PORTION OF A VISUAL DISPLAY BOARD

chief, one first class, two second class, and three third class. As the master group includes chief and first class, the master allowance is two. For this example, the type command percentage of allowance is 140 percent, therefore, the base percentage will be set at 150 percent. This permits three master boatswain's mates for each destroyer. The U.S.S. Able has one chief boatswain's mate on board and one first class soon to report, being in-transit to the U.S.S. Able at this moment. This leaves a shortage of one from the base figure (base figure 3, on-board or in-transit 2). Therefore, a red number 1 peg is placed in the master file. The present chief boatswain's mate is due to retire within four months. This is an anticipated loss which will reduce the U.S.S. Able by one more master boatswain's mate in the near future. To keep in mind such a potential loss which will either reduce the group below the base figure within the four month period or further reduce the present shortage, a yellow number 1 peg is placed next to the red peg in the master priority designators file. The number of the yellow peg plus the number of the red peg indicates the total number in each group which the ship will be below the base figure at the end of the four month period if no additional input is made. The period of four months was arbitrarily selected to permit early relief for ships operating from the home port for short periods. For ships going to the forward area, this time period was extended for the duration of the cruise. For these latter ships, all red and yellow pegs should be removed before the date of departure from the continental U.S.A. for the forward area so that replacements will not have to be transported to the forward area. Thus, these ships are top priority for persons with longer periods of obligated service remaining.

To continue with the example, the allowance of the U.S.S. Able in journeymen boatswain's mates is five. With a base percentage set at 90 percent, the base figure is five (taken to the next higher even number if a decimal results from applying the base percentage to the allowance). A red number 2 peg is placed in the journeyman file. The same reasoning holds true for the quartermasters. In the example, the master base figure is two, and the journeyman base figure is three. It can be seen that one of the present journeyman quartermasters is scheduled to leave within four months.

The seaman rate group in the example has an allowance of seventy-two. The U.S.S. Able base fifty-eight on-board with five in-transit. The over-all total file will control the input of seamen and firemen. The white number 5 peg in the allowance column of the total file means that sufficient over-all totals of manpower are available to give each destroyer up to the total allowance minus five. The U.S.S. Able has a shortage of fourteen at the moment and can receive nine more men of any rating or rate. The number in the allowance column of the total file is adjusted as the over-all manpower situation dictates. The problem as to which rating will fill the master or journeyman shortage is solved by studying the actual ship's rating structure and job codes (if applicable) before assignment. In the case of the U.S.S. Able, it would be advisable to remove the red number 1 peg in the master boatswain's mates file by ordering in a chief boatswain's mate. The only chief now on board is scheduled to leave shortly. In the key ratings such as this chief boatswain's mate it would be advisable to place a colored signal peg next to the white number 1 peg in the on-board row in the chief file to signal

this need.

It required three petty officers, under the supervision of the personnel officer, to maintain this system. One chief personnelman made the assignments, except special ratings which were called to the attention of the personnel officer, when personnel were available. This enlisted man decided on the assignment, reduced the priority designators and increased the in-transit part of the column on each assignment, and entered the detailed information on the in-transit Kardex card. The second man, a personnelman first class, controlled the boards, by correcting the boards for men reporting and leaving each team. Losses required that the priority designators be increased. This petty officer reviewed each team's display periodically, when time permitted, to rectify any errors which might have crept in. The third petty officer maintained the latest monthly Activity Distribution Reports, by correcting them according to the latest personnel diaries received with write-in entries. When the new reports were received once a month, all personnel of the office worked on transposing any write-in information not in the new reports to these new reports. The old reports were then filed. By this procedure the personnel officer was afforded a complete, concise picture of the personnel situation in the type command at all times. Special plans, priorities, and the base were determined by the personnel officer and incorporated in the visual display for routine execution by assistants. In addition to aiding the personnel officer in the efficient assignment and reassignment of personnel, the system was entirely above-board and the type command's status was available at all times to the ships' representatives so that they could see their condition in relation to all

others and also could see future plans for their commands.

The large boards were used in pairs. The first two covered one half of the ratings, the other two the second half of the ratings. Two boards twice the normal length would have served the purpose better. The small board was used to display those ratings which were restricted to the larger ships, such as the special repair ratings. The staffs were also displayed on the smaller board. Other Kardexes were used to maintain special information. One was used to maintain information on special details of highly skilled personnel, arranged by skills, another displayed similiar information, but was arranged by teams. With such information, if a particular skill were required for some special need, any person with such qualifications in the type command could be quickly located.

The system proved very efficient, but limitations were realized. No system can be more efficient than the existing placement aids permit. In wartime, it would have to be expanded greatly to account for the greater emphasis on specialization. Greater use of job codes was being experimented with and was incorporated in many cases. To be highly efficient in wartime, assignments should be made by job codes, and the boards would have to list the job codes rather than the ratings. Under the conditions (many shortages and need for broad training) which existed at the time of its development, the system did meet the need of internal control. The Activity Distribution Report and the Personnel Diaries formed the basis of the system. The Composite Strength Report was used to survey the entire type command and determine percentages of allowance for the determination of base percentages and comparison with the over-all fleet percentages.

CHAPTER V

THE CRITERIA FOR A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

The Need for Criteria

In order to judge the present system of personnel distribution as to its adequacy in meeting the Navy's needs and to determine whether or not some modification would provide greater effectiveness, the criteria for a distribution system must be established. These criteria must be within the realm of possibility to be of value. While perfection may be striven for, it must be recognized that the Navy is not a free agent. The impact of the federal budget, international commitments, and the national policies cause operating and administrative conditions beyond the control of the Navy. The numbers of men and the training facilities are limited in time of peace by the budget and in time of war by the requirements of other services and industry. The wages of naval personnel are established by law. A part of the success in attracting the type of person the Navy needs in time of peace depends upon the wages paid compared with those of civilian industry. Securing new pay legislation is a time consuming process. The accordion-like prepardness program this country has pursued since the close of World War II has placed a difficult burden upon the system for distribution of personnel. The purpose of this chapter is to establish criteria for a distribution system which will produce the best possible results under the conditions and limitations which can be anticipated.

Some transfer of personnel between naval activities is inevitable

Some conditions cannot be helped, at least by the Navy, and the distribution system must provide a scheme for the adjustment of naval manpower to these changing situations with the minimum of adverse effect upon the basic teams and the individuals. Other transfers are a result of normal Navy business or for the benefit of the persons involved; these must be accomplished as efficiently as possible in order to reduce the loss of man-hours of performance to the minimum consistent with doing the job and maintaining morale. Any other transfers are due to poor distribution; these must be eliminated. Commander D. A. Stuart, USN, Head, Enlisted Detailing Section, BuPers, divided the conditions which cause a flow of personnel into two factors, the "policy factors" and the "operating factors."[1] The "policy factors" are those beyond the control of the Navy, necessary for conducting the Navy's business, and necessary to provide for the welfare of the Navy's personnel. These are specified by Commander Stuart as follows:[2]

1. Frequent and radical changes in the strength of the Navy.
2. Changes in the structure of the Naval establishment.
3. Modification and changes in missions.
4. Special projects.
5. New construction.
6. Reactivation of reserve fleet ships.
7. Obligated service requirements of personnel of ships sailing for overseas duty.
8. Short tours of duty for personnel at overseas bases.
9. Sea-shore rotation of personnel.
10. Transfers for humanitarian and personal hardship cases.

The "operating factors" are those which can be improved by the distribution system and BuPers policy determination. Commander Stuart lists these as

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[1] Commander D. A. Stuart, USN, "Permanency of Personnel," _Proceedings of the Personnel Officers Conference, 1949_ (Washington: Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1949), pp. 76-77.

[2] _Loc cit._

follows:[3]

1. Short enlistments.
2. Low enlistment rate.
3. Shortage of rated personnel.
4. Poor distribution and detailing [placement].

The first three "operating factors" were not within the control of BuPers or the lower echelons during the years preceeding 1949 in the opinion of the writer. They were the result of attempts to rectify the conditions imposed by the preparedness program of the country, the aftermath of the war, and high employment in civilian industry. The fourth factor is fully concurred with. A study conducted in BuPers analyzed the flow of personnel from May 31, 1948, through June 1, 1949.[4] It was determined that the average person was transferred to a new duty station once every two years. This means that one-half of the Navy's manpower was in transit at some time during the course of each year. This flow involved only the permanent transfers. The temporary flow to schools, hospitals, etc., would add materially to the numbers involved. This flow of personnel cannot be avoided, due to the rigors of military duty and fluctuating requirements, but it can be reduced. In addition to this, it can be more equally balanced between the basic teams and the Navy's personnel.

Each criterion of distribution must be multidimensional in character, due to the many interrelated factors which are involved. The principal factors must be considered as a foundation for the determination of the criteria. The factors can be grouped under three categories.

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[3] *Loc. cit.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

(1) the requirements of the basic teams, (2) the requirements of the individuals involved, and (3) administrative requirements. It must be remembered that the factors which make up these three fundamental requirements are interrelated and may at times work at cross-purposes. They are also complicated by fluctuating commitments and a fluctuating manpower supply. The distribution system must provide for a logical balance as far as possible for the most effective results.

The Requirements of the Basic Teams

The first consideration as to what a distribution system must provide should be given to the fundamental requirements of the basic teams. It is through these teams and their co-ordinated effort that the Navy is enabled to accomplish its mission. It is, therefore, of paramount importance that they function effectively. It is the individuals, who are members of the teams, with their skills and abilities that give the basic teams their strength. Everything else, such as equipment, supplies, etc., are auxiliary. The distribution system must provide the necessary manpower. This manpower must be effective, and it must be provided in the most effecient manner. A ship manned by a crew of quartermasters would not be effective. A distribution system which keeps a large part of the Navy's manpower in a non-productive status is not effecient. This includes unnecessary transfers, long periods of time in-transit between duty stations, accumulations of manpower in receiving stations awaiting orders or transportation, and people in jobs below the level of their skill.

The first need of a basic team is a qualified man for each billet

whether it be a chief electrician's mate to supervise the maintenance of the ship's electric plant or a seaman apprentice for a general billet in the deck force. Every billet requires a standard Navy product, a man trained in the Navy's methods and equipment. The more important the billet, the more experienced and trained a product will be required. The more technical the billet, the more specialized the skill which will be required. At present it is the complement or allowance established by BuPers which is used to determine the needs. In the future, it is anticipated that billet specifications will become of increasing importance. The idea of pre-commissioning centers has a situation advantage in creating new crews because of the added placement aids available at such an activity. These are interview, personal observation, and additional testing for special abilities. With these aids, more accurate placement can be attempted. The future may bring more detailed classifications, which would serve as aids to the normal distribution activities for greater accuracy. On the basis of determined needs, the distribution system selects the required personnel. The nucleus will come from teams already in operation, by transfer of those persons with the desired classification from those teams which can most afford the loss. The method used may be (1) the use of waiting lists of volunteers for new construction, (2) selection by name from certain operating teams, or (3) merely by requiring certain teams to provide so many men trained and qualified in specified classifications. Whatever method used the persons should come from those ships which can afford the loss. Furthermore, the rate of withdrawal from any one basic team must be slow; otherwise, the team's effectiveness will be materially reduced. This

requires planning, co-ordination, and accurate records on the part of the distribution hierarchy. A portion of the team will come from trained men who are available for assignment, such as advanced school graduates, men available on sea-shore rotation, or through reassignments after leave, etc. The balance will be filled by recruits from the training centers.

The next problem for a new basic team is integration. This is accomplished by organization and team training. After the shake-down period, which is usually conducted by the fleet's training command or an aviation training activity, the basic team is ready to become an active unit of the fleet.

The second need of the basic team is permanency of personnel. If the team is continually being broken apart, no amount of training will ever bring it up to Navy standards of performance. Attrition of the team's membership must be accepted, but adequate controls must be provided in order to insure that losses are gradual. A slow influx of new personnel is beneficial. The primary peacetime cause of attrition is the loss to the service due to the failure of many men to reenlist. From the close of World War II to the approach of the present emergency, such losses were heavy. The loss occurred mainly in the lower pay grades and in occupational fields where there was a civilian demand. The teams with high morale and desirable geographic locations lost fewer men than the less fortunate teams. The result was a continual unbalance of teams. Where the training program could not keep up with losses, outside help had to be provided by cannibalizing the remaining teams. This had an adverse effect on the more successful teams as they had to provide men with the

necessary skills and abilities. The distribution system must place what persons it has available for assignments as carefully as possible. Removals from operating basic teams must have the minimum adverse effect. In times of emergency, enlistments are automatically extended so there is no problem in this regard. Other factors become of greater significance during times of emergency due to expansion. Crews must be provided for many new teams. Normal rotation of duty will offset permanency of personnel, but this is necessary. It is undesirable for men to serve their entire careers on one ship or even at sea from the standpoint of training and morale. This distribution system must provide for change either to other basic teams at sea or to shore duty if the person so desires after a reasonable period of service on any one team. Replacement, if required, should be available through the process of rotating others. Rotation poses less of a problem than losses due to separations from the service. A skill rotated is replaceable from other sources in the rotation cycle. A skill lost to the service is replaceable only by a new recruit; obviously, in that case, the scales are unbalanced. The training program must bring the scales back into balance by a chain reaction. The skill leaving the service must be replaced by one on the next lower level of the training hierarchy, and so on until the new recruit fills the bottom position vacated due to everyone moving up one space. Losses to schools are temporary, with a greater future gain. If the school quota is non-returnable, the basic team may lose the service of particular individuals permanently, but there is an over-all Navy gain. The distribution system must insure that a gain is realized by proper placement of the new skill where it can be most efficiently utilized.

The important factors in permanency of personnel are as follows:

1. Withdrawal should occur from teams which can best afford the loss.

2. Withdrawal from any one team should be gradual and well planned.

3. Withdrawals should result in an over-all gain to the service, whether it be in effectiveness of teams or increased morale.

4. Replacement of withdrawals, if required, should be from normal rotation if possible.

The third requirement is that every team should receive its share of those persons available for assignment. Equal performance cannot be expected if the teams do not receive equal treatment. The causes of unequal treatment are pressure at some level of the distribution hierarchy, the lack of advanced planning on forseeable requirements, and failure to provide for possible unexpected eventualities.

The fourth requirement is that relief be present in many cases where key enlisted personnel are withdrawn from the team. An example of this would be the case of a ship with one master electrician on board. If he is withdrawn for another commitment, it is mandatory that a relief with similar qualifications be on board before he departs. If not, a dangerous situation can exist. If an executive officer is not qualified to command, the commanding officer certainly would not be withdrawn without his relief being on board. A similar situation exists in the case of key enlisted personnel. The distribution system must provide for this. This requirement has further implications. Reliefs of specific qualifications and numerical reliefs must be available for placement in the team expeditiously, to maintain the team at maximum effectiveness.

This can be accomplished in peacetime only by careful planning and removal at propitious times, such as when ships or aircraft are in port or at bases in the continental U.S.A. Otherwise transportation facilities must be used. This results in delays and lost man-hours of performance, but at times it is necessary. In times of national emergency, if sufficient reserve manpower is available, there is an advantage in establishing pools of this reserve manpower at strategic geographical locations to replace unexpected losses incident to war. The distribution system must maintain these pools at levels consistent with the possible requirements of the basic teams operating in the respective areas.

The fifth requirement is the withdrawal of the right persons from the basic teams when withdrawals are necessary. All too many commanding officers have the idea that if someone must be transferred, it should be the least valuable member of the team. This is human nature, but it results in a permanent corps of persons who are continually on the move. Wherever they go, they are the first to be eligible for transfer. Their morale and their training are the price. This is the result of the issuance of orders on a "so many of a certain qualification" basis. The odd part of the situation is that these people sometimes receive faster promotions than the more permanent, better qualified persons. The author has personally known of cases where very poorly qualified men have actually been promoted in order to have the necessary qualifications on paper to meet a withdrawal quota. The result is that the man did not meet the qualifications for the need for which he was transferred, the Navy as a whole lost, and there was a loss in morale in the permanent team who stayed behind. The distribution system must compensate for this

tendency.

The sixth requirement is the need for advance notice of plans insofar as they affect the members of the basic teams. If it is known that a certain member of a basic team is going to be withdrawn in the near future, immediate steps can be taken to compensate for the loss, and a replacement may be made available without loss of time. By the time the person actually leaves, the basic team will be able to operate without his services in a better manner than if less notice had been received. This is a matter of planning and co-ordination on all levels of the distribution hierarchy.

The seventh requirement is one which affects all teams alike. This is the holding to a minimum of the numbers transferred and the period of time persons are in transit resulting in lost man-hours of performance. Permanency of personnel will reduce the flow by reducing the frequency of movement. Straight line transfers will reduce the time any one person is in transit to a new duty station. In other words each person to be transferred should remain productive in his present billet until his new duty station is specifically determined. He should then be transferred directly to his new duty station without delays in pools awaiting assignment. The transportation time also should be considered in making the new assignment. All other things being equal, it would not be practical to transfer a person from New York to meet a need in Pearl Harbor when a person of proper qualification is available in San Francisco. Better yet, it may be possible to find the right person in Pearl Harbor. This suggests the advantage of the placement activity having wide geographic coverage. Transportation time can be reduced,

especially where basic teams are widely dispersed. There is also an advantage in having widely dispersed pools at times when reserve manpower are available. The straight line transfer and the reduced travel time do not reduce the frequency of movement, but the period of non-productiveness and cost to the government are materially reduced.

The temporary non-productiveness of those persons in schools or undergoing recruit training is a temporary sacrifice for greater future benefits. The limitations on the numbers of persons in schools are imposed by school facilities and the operating requirements of the basic teams. The distribution system must provide for expeditious movement of trainees in order that this period of non-productiveness is reduced to a minimum.

Another factor in the non-productiveness of personnel results from placing the man in the wrong team. If the team does not have a vacancy where the man's skills and abilities can be used, he will be assigned to whatever duties the teams may need or to unnecessary tasks. In the case of a skilled man, the duties assigned may be completely foreign to him or below his level of skill. The former results in lost performance and possible frustration. The latter results in lost potential and lost morale. In an organization the size of the Navy, there are vacant billets which can efficiently utilize all available skills; at least a very high positive transfer of training is possible. In other words, the new job will require qualifications basically similar to the man's qualifications. The greater the number of basic teams under a given placement officer the greater the possibility of finding the correct billet for each man. Thus for efficient placement

wide coverage is necessary. If the placement coverage is small, the higher level distribution activities must be more specific in their distribution, so that all skills may be efficiently utilized. The more specific the distribution, the closer the placement it becomes and the greater the reason for eliminating a subordinate placement activity and permitting the distribution activity next above in the hierarchy to perform actual placement.

These are the fundamental requirements of the basic teams. They can be summarized as follows:

1. The right person for each billet.
2. Permanency of personnel.
3. A fair share of available personnel for each team.
4. Expeditious provision of reliefs.
5. Reduction of the corps of permanent transients.
6. Advance notice of transfers where possible.
7. Reduction in the quantity of non-productive personnel.

Requirements of the Individuals

All too often the human element is overlooked in a big organization; when looking for an easy solution to a personnel problem, it is all too easy to say that "the needs of the service must come first." High morale is necessary for effectiveness in any basic team. The development of morale is a requirement for every naval activity. Human beings can take a great deal without loss of morale when they can see a reason. A person who is bounced from pillar to post by a distribution system is likely to be unhappy to say the least, and with good reason. If persons must be transferred, it should be done expeditiously, after a maximum of advance

notice. The feelings and desires of the individual should be considered in establishing the criteria for the distribution system.

The first requirement is that each man be placed in a billet where he can use his skills and abilities. Efficient placement will mean success on the job to him. If the duties of his billet are too difficult for him, he usually fails. If he cannot use his skills and abilities, he feels that he is wasting his time. If he is placed in a billet inferior to his level of advancement, his pride suffers and his morale declines.

The second requirement is the psychological rejuvenation of environmental change. After a certain period of service in any one basic team, the majority of persons in Navy life desire a change. Interests begin to shift to finding ways and means of obtaining a change of duty, and productivity begins to decline. At this point, conditions permitting, the person should be moved. He should be moved to the new duty he desires as nearly as this can be done. The return of interests to the job will increase productivity. Each man should receive his share of rigorous and easy duty. This requires that the distribution system maintain a sea-shore rotation program fair to all and provide administrative means to permit transfers between basic teams at sea after a reasonable period of service in any one team or in special circumstances. The only involuntary part of a normal rotation program is the return to sea after a tour of shore duty. Some people prefer to remain ashore indefinitely. Some prefer to remain at sea. These people should be permitted to do so, as there is always a shortage of shore billets for those who deserve them.

The third requirement is the provision of fair selection methods

for new activities and teams. Many commanding officers are reluctant to permit their best men to volunteer for new duty, such as new construction, and when called upon to provide a man of specified qualifications, they designate one of the least valuable members of the crew. If the duty for which selection has been made is undesirable, nobody's morale is affected except the unfortunate one who is chosen, and there are many of them. If the duty is highly desirable or has greater possibilities, those who are not selected, who know they are better qualified, are, resentful. The over-all result of transfers for both types of duty is lost morale. Both teams suffer since the person transferred does not meet the need for which the transfer was ordered in the first place. "Name transfers" in the case of petty officers and at least "length of service" requirements in the case of the lower pay grades should be used. These would provide equal opportunity to all and standardize the methods used. This is definitely a problem on the placement level. Proper withdrawal is as important as proper placement. Both have an important effect on the team involved. At certain times withdrawal of key people will impose a problem, but if adequate notice of intentions is given, the commanding officer can submit reasons as to why it is not a propitious time for withdrawal of a certain man. If the disadvantages outweigh the advantages of the transfer, the order can be modified. Modification of orders should be an infrequent procedure, however. Some commanding officers always give the most deserving person the chance, but the numbers of these commanding officers are all too few. The person who has been on board the longest and who has the required qualifications should be the one transferred in the majority of cases. This is a safe

thumb rule for the placement officer.

The fourth requirement is advance notice. Every man likes to make preparations for a transfer. The unmarried man requires less time than the man with a family. Advance notice is especially important where families must be moved. Enlisted men are like anyone else, they do not like to be pulled out on a moment's notice and set down far away. If a man cannot arrange for the moving of his family, he becomes bitter and is not as productive at his new duty station as he could have been if consideration had been given to his personal problems. Anyone who has been in the armed forces who has been given one day to be on his way and who must tell his wife that she will have to attend to the moving herself, can attest to this. If the man was not bitter before, he soon will be after the family arrives at the new duty station. Things are accepted during a time of national emergency which are not palatable during peace. In war, families usually remain stationary, and the quick movement of men is accepted as part of the urgency of the times. In most cases, advance notice is possible, with proper planning and co-ordination, and it should be used.

The fifth requirement is the desire for permanency. Persons like change but not too frequently. Neither the morale nor the productivity of the permanent corps of transients will ever be high. When a person joins the team, he wants to feel that he is a part of it. If he knows that he is just passing through, his interest level will remain low, and his productivity will be low.

The sixth requirement is a minimum time in transit. When the time comes for transfer, the person wants to know exactly where he is

going and arrangements should be made for him to proceed to the new team as expeditiously as possible. Longer periods of travel will be accepted by the person, if he is going to a locality of his choice. Leave while in transit is important for married men, as it permits time to move the family and to find living accomodations in the new locality before reporting for duty. Unmarried persons should be granted their leave before transfer unless a saving in time lost in production can be realized by permitting leave while in transit. If leave is permitted during transit, it should be for a standard period of time. This will allow the receiving command to estimate the time of arrival for duty.

The seventh requirement is that a promotion in rating should be accompanied by a promotion in position. If a vacancy does not exist, one should be created for the person, or he should be transferred to a team which does have a need for his services and can give him the position called for by his new rating, which is important for morale. Many hold the belief that when a person is promoted to chief petty officer, he should be transferred to a new basic team. This permits him to divorce himself from his previous position as "one of the boys" and have a good start in his new responsibilities. Another case exists where a person has been demoted for disciplinary or administrative reasons. Transfer facilitates a fresh start.

The eighth requirement is provision for means of rectifying hardships. Where a difficult situation can be rectified only by the serviceman's presence, the person should be transferred to the naval activity closest his home until his emergency is solved. If the condition cannot be rectified in a reasonable amount of time, then he

should be granted an administrative discharge. Transfer or discharge should be resorted to only if emergency leave will not suffice. Humanitarian reasons for transfer do exist and should be provided for. Consideration in time of trouble means higher morale in the future.

In addition to those basic requirements of a distribution system, the general improvement in efficiency which is promoted by good personnel administration on the part of the basic teams and higher echelons means much to good morale. Good morale means a higher reenlistment rate and greater productivity in the service. A high reenlistment rate means greater permanency of personnel. The distribution system must include all conditions necessary for good morale where possible. The human requirements can be summarized as follows:

1. Placement in a billet which the person is suited for.
2. Normal rotation of duty.
3. Fairness in selection for transfer.
4. Advance notice of transfer.
5. Permanency of personnel.
6. Reduced time in transit, direct transfers, and provision for families.
7. Promotion in position as well as in rating.
8. Provision for humanitarian transfers.

Administrative Requirements

The solution of the distribution problem lies in the administrative means used to meet the fundamental requirements previously discussed in a dynamic Navy world of changing strength and structure. The fundamental requirements of the basic teams and their individual members remain

fairly constant, and they must be satisfied. The dynamic Navy world of personnel expansion, technological advance, and numerical decline complicates the meeting of the fundamental requirements, but it is a result of changing national policies and progress and must be accepted. The purpose of distribution is to meet the Navy's manpower requirements. These requirements must be forecast and a plan of action established. To place the plan into effect an organization is required, which must make a co-ordinated effort for success. Command or authority must give directive force to the action, and control will be required to insure results. These are the elements of administration according to Henri Fayol. "He defines administration as 'to plan, organize, command, co-ordinate, and control.'"[5]

Planning is necessary to determine a course of action. In the distribution of personnel, two basic phases of planning exist. First, the present and future personnel needs of the currently active basic teams must be known. This is determined by accurate personnel accounting, knowledge of prospective advancement in skills and personnel losses, and future operations of each basic team. Second, information must be available on the future expansion of basic teams, their number, type, composition, location, and intended employment. This also applies to changes in structure or dissolution of existing basic teams. On the basis of these forecasts, the numbers and qualifications of the individuals required must be determined. A plan of action must provide the

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[5] As quoted from the works of Henri Fayol by L. Urwick, "The Functions of Administration," Paper on the Science of Administration, ed. by Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937), p. 119.

procurement, development, and distribution methods to be used to produce results, at least as closely as limitations imposed upon the Navy will permit. This plan of action must be constructed, however, within the framework of the fundamental requirements of the basic teams and the individuals. Distribution planning is not original planning as it is based upon and facilitates the execution of plans developed by the top Navy command by providing the necessary manpower to carry out these top level plans. If a field organization is to exist in the distribution process, then each subordinate distribution activity will have to develop local plans in order to determine its course of action within the over-all plan for distribution. This means co-ordinated planning on all levels. To be able to plan, each subordinate activity in the field must be kept informed as to what is expected of it, the problems which it will have to solve locally, and over-all future plans.

The organization which is to execute the distribution plan must be co-ordinated in order to accomplish the common end. L. Urwick speaks of such co-ordination as "Where organization is concerned with quantities and numbers and the setting up of a structure to facilitate their unified working, co-ordination is concerned with securing that working from day to day and hour to hour; it involves constant attention to the machine in action to secure that harmony and balance are preserved in operation as well as in design and structure."[6] If all phases of distribution were conducted by BuPers, and no field organization

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[6] L. Urwick, "Organization as a Technical Problem," Papers on The Science of Administration, ed. by Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937), p. 77.

existed, only co-ordination between BuPers and the top line authority would be necessary in the distribution process. Due to geographic spread, magnitude of the problem, need of local contact, and other administrative advantages of decentralization, a field organization is considered necessary. L. Urwick outlined some of the advantages of departmentalization on the basis of geographic areas in government.

> "Decentralization of geographic divisions strengthens these tendencies [co-ordination with local requirements], and serves, moreover, to reduce travel costs, short circuit adjustment problems, cut red tape, and speed up all joint activities and administrative decisions. It increases not only the awareness of the officials to local needs and to the interrelation of service and planning problems, but develops a new sensitivity to the process of democratic control through intimate association of the officials with the people served."[7]

As the government serves the people, the distribution organization serves the basic teams. At the beginning of World War II, BuPers found it necessary to decentralize enlisted distribution to the fleet levels. As the war progressed, placement was further decentralized to the type and area command levels. With the Navy's manpower growing by leaps and bounds to a strength of about three million men and women, centralized distribution and placement broke down, and a field organization was the only alternative. An important criterion to be noted here is that the peacetime organization should have the same basic structure as the wartime organization in order that the transition may be smooth and efficient. Another reason for dispersion of distribution activities is the vulnerability of one center to enemy damage. The organization should be so co-ordinated that any one activity could take

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[7] L. Urwick, "The Theory of Organization," op. cit., p. 30.

over the functions of any other in case of destruction. This also makes standard methods a necessity.

The next organization question is whether the field organization should be part of a common auxiliary agency or a staff component of the line hierarchy. This problem is a debatable issue. Large American industries have found it desirable to have personnel agencies which are below the central personnel office subordinate to the particular division or branch manager they serve. "Usually such [personnel] agencies are directly responsible to the line executives whom they serve, and functionally responsible to the central staff office."[8] The question as to which method is better is as yet unsolved in the U. S. Civil Service.[9] The big advantage of having a common auxiliary agency for personnel distribution in the Navy is co-ordination and more positive control by BuPers over distribution. During the last war problems arose due to the fact that BuPers did not have the necessary control over distribution to enable carrying out of its policies.[10] This was rectified somewhat by bringing the field organization into closer co-ordination with BuPers, but the primary responsibility to the line hierarchy remained. The advantages in having the distribution agencies as staff to the line on the various levels is to insure responsiveness to their needs and to

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[8] Paul E. Holden, Lounsbury S. Fish, and Hubert L. Smith, Top-Management Organization and Control (Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1941), pp. 40-41.

[9] William E. Mosher and others, Public Personnel Administration, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 583.

[10] Bureau of Naval Personnel, United States Naval Administration in World War II, First Draft Narrative Prepared under the General Supervision of the Director of Naval History (unpublished), p. 39.

prevent the auxiliary agency from thinking only of its own problems. If one had capable officers with considerable fleet experience in the auxiliary agency and close liaison with the line authorities, this primary objection would be less weighty; a common auxiliary distribution agency centered in BuPers could be founded, and yet normal personnel administration need not be removed from the line. This is a question which will require future study. Whichever organization structure is used, the important requisites are a co-ordinated effort throughout the service, standard policies and procedures, and a maximum responsiveness to needs of the line. A related problem is presented by the fact that the operating hierarchy is geographically organized as is the administrative hierarchy, with the exception of the type commands. These are organized primarily on a clientile basis, destroyers, cruisers, air forces, etc. A question arises whether or not the assignment of placement responsibility on a level so organized produces the greatest efficiency in distribution. This must be considered further after the results of the present method used in the Navy are properly analyzed in a later chapter.

Another phase of the organization problem is the communications and paper work involved in achieving co-ordination of the distribution activities. Naturally the fewer activities involved in distribution the smaller will be the paper problem. The magnitude of the communications and mail problem in the Navy is tremendous. Anything which will reduce paper work will help the entire Navy's administration. Paper work means delays and red tape. The greater the number of administrative offices which must clear action before it can take place, the greater will be the time interval before needs are met. The requirement in this respect

is the reduction of communications and paper work, or the fewer the distribution activities the better.

In order to accomplish its mission, the distribution authority or command must have prestige. In military circles this means rank. After the distribution of personnel was decentralized early in World War II, BuPers found it increasingly difficult to control the execution of its policies. This problem was rectified in the Pacific by transferring the distribution of personnel from a lower hierarchical Pacific command to the Commander, Western Sea Frontier and elevating this office to Deputy Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. With the greater prestige, this officer took control and insured the accomplishment of personnel distribution in accordance with BuPers policies.[11] Effectiveness in distribution demands authority. Command must exist to insure control.

Control, in a sense, is the consequence of command. Any plan of action requires constant checking to insure results. For this discussion the function of control is extended to the day by day operations of managing personnel distribution, the filling of the needs in accordance with the plan and insuring results. The fundamental requirement of control is efficient personnel accounting and methodology. Results are built on the external and internal systems used. The needs must be known, the priorities of action determined, orders issued, and a follow-up procedure established to insure compliance. The control systems must be concise, fast, responsive, and demonstrative. In order to have co-ordination throughout the organization, the control systems must be

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[11] Ibid., pp. 39-41.

standardized in order to be interchangeable. This would permit one activity to take over the function of another in case of emergency or destruction.

Thus it can be seen that the solution to the distribution of enlisted personnel lies in the administrative means used. The fundamental requirements and the changing situations must be met. The fundamental administrative requirements can be summarized as follows:

1. Co-ordinated planning throughout the entire distribution system.
2. Co-ordinated action in the distribution organization. Standard policies and procedures for the field organization to operate by.
3. A common organizational structure in peace and war.
4. Responsiveness to the needs of the line organization.
5. A minimum of communications and paper work.
6. Command or the necessary authority to pursue a plan of action and insure results.
7. An effective and standard external and internal means of control.

The Criteria

The most efficient distribution system is one which will meet the maximum number of the fundamental requirements the majority of the time. No system can be perfect, with the limitations which exist, however, an attempt must be made to approach perfection as closely as possible. In order to accomplish this, planning is essential. The ability to plan is based upon how much information is available on what is going to happen. In order to effect a plan of action all activities concerned with distribution must make a co-ordinated effort, and controls are necessary to

insure that this effort brings the desired results.

First, planning must be possible on all levels of the distribution hierarchy. The central personnel agency (BuPers) must determine an over-all distribution plan based on the top Navy line command's structural, operating, and strength plans. In co-ordination with the over-all plan and with each other, the subordinate distribution agencies must adopt local plans which will serve the basic teams within their respective jurisdictions. Without some plan for future distribution, action becomes a day to day solution, and many violations of fundamental requirements will occur. Each echelon must know the plans of the next higher level which concern it so that the means can be determined to carry out their responsibilities in an efficient manner. The farther that plans can be projected into the future, the better the plan can be adjusted to the fundamental requirements. The fewer field echelons there are the easier plans can be co-ordinated. This is due to the fact there are less people involved in the process. This will be discussed again later in this section under organization. A co-ordinated plan of action projected well into the future will permit the following:

1. Accurate distribution and placement with a maximum of permanency. In other words, to place each man correctly the first time, future needs must be known. If unexpected needs are continually cropping up, a constant shuffling of personnel will result. This means less permanency of personnel. If the happenings of the future are known, people can be so placed that future needs will be provided for. An example of this would be a case where a given man is made available. The type commander would assign him to a team with a known need. Then a week later the

fleet commander gives the type commander a personnel quota to provide for a new ship being reactivated with one of the requirements being the qualifications of the man just assigned. This man or another man would have to be transferred again to the new ship. Suppose the need of this new ship had been known in advance. Then the new man could have been assigned to the new ship in the first place. Instead of two transfers there would have been only one. This one would have been made anyway. Multiply this one case by the many which could occur daily and the need for advance plans becomes obvious. Even if the need does not exist at the moment, accurate distribution and placement means proper balance in the future, as future needs are anticipated in the assignment of persons currently available. The accuracy of initial placement, the permanency of personnel, and the smooth anticipation of future needs depend on coordinated planning.

2. Orderly withdrawals. Long range plans by the higher echelons should permit advance notice to the lower echelons, and ultimately to the basic teams and to the individuals. Without this advance notice all down the line, spur of the moment orders must be issued with the resulting mistakes and damage to basic teams and morale. With advance notice many future commitments can be handled by careful use of available personnel; and if withdrawals from the basic teams are required, the basic teams can be alerted well in advance. This permits meeting the fundamental requirements of the basic teams and the individuals as previously discussed.

3. Propitious replacement. When withdrawals have been planned well in advance, reliefs, if required, can be on their way to arrive prior to the departure of the withdrawn person. This not only applies to

planned withdrawals of the type commander but also to anticipated losses due to orders from higher commands for individuals by name and expiration of enlistment. Pools strategically located or wide geographic coverage by the placement officer would permit adequate and timely relief for unexpected losses.

4. Compensation for unavailable input. It is a great advantage for a distribution or placement activity to know about what it can expect in the way of personnel for distribution to its subordinate commands or for assignment to its teams and the qualifications of each of these men to be received. Many officers will say this is impossible, but the writer firmly believes that it is possible. Granted that it cannot be done without long range planning and some of the people will not be available as planned due to sickness or some other unexpected cause, but even a ray of light is better than complete darkness when trying to find ones way in the distribution maze. National preparedness will have to become stabilized before extreme long range planning can be attempted, but it is a goal to strive for. Even knowing a month in advance what supply of personnel can be expected would certainly ease the planning problem for each officer involved in distribution and placement. By knowing what to expect, training plans can be drawn up to compensate for the deficiencies, and the flow of personnel can be directed to the correct place at the correct time. This involves timing and examples will be given in the next chapter as to its significance.

Second, the carrying out of co-ordinated plans requires a co-ordinated organization. The work must be divided, but each separate distribution activity must strive for a common goal. The organization

can only achieve maximum effectiveness if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. Geographic unity. In order to meet the needs with a maximum of selectivity, a maximum coverage of manpower supply, a minimum of travel time and red tape, one distribution activity should co-ordinate all subordinate distribution activities on the basis of a given geographical area of naval operations. One placement activity should serve all basic teams in a given geographical area of operations. This prevents over-lapping of functions and unnecessary transportation. It permits one pool in a given area, one transportation liaison, unity of command, and allows standard treatment for all. It also facilitates liaison with the operating commander who is in a position to know his operating needs. If he and his teams can deal with one distribution activity rather than ten, the problem is simplified.

2. A minimum number of distribution activities. The greater the number of steps which must be taken from the original availability assignment to placement, the greater the delay and the greater the loss of productivity. For example, if there are five steps or echelons to placement and the delay at each step is two days, the lost man-days per man is ten days. If the steps could be reduced to two and still be done effectively, the saving would be six man-days per man. If a million men are moved in a year, this means an added productive force of about 16,440 men per year, enough to man sixteen cruisers. It may be said that if a man is actually on a job, he is productive until the day he leaves no matter how long the administrative action to place him in his new job takes. The majority of men will let down materially once they know they

are to be transferred. Those who are waiting orders in schools, receiving stations, and training centers are not productive. The reduction of travel time can only be accomplished by judicious assignment. To select a person from the closest point of the need, requires knowledge and the power to order those available all over the geographic area. Fewer distribution activities mean less communications and less paper work. Fewer "fingers in the soup" means greater co-ordination and co-operation.

3. High authority. In order to relieve the distribution system from pressures from many sources, high prestige and authority are necessary. The more junior the officer in charge of any distribution activity, the greater will be the pressures which will claim special privileges and thus affect his efficiency and fairness. This requirement may be satisfied by fewer activities. The last stage, or the placement level, must be sufficiently high in the Navy's hierarchy to have a senior ranking personnel officer who can resist unwarranted pressures. High authority and its necessary counterpart, fewer distribution activities will permit greater functional co-ordination. Reference is made to the example of elevating distribution prestige to Commander, Western Sea Frontier during World War II to achieve just this objective.[12]

4. Maximum responsiveness to line needs. Maximum responsiveness places a limitation upon centralization. It is an advantage in many respects to have the field distribution activities near the line. With the distribution activities subordinate to the line at each hierarchical level, maximum responsiveness is attained, however, certain losses in

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[12] See page 92.

functional co-ordination develop due to line jealousies of their prerogatives and the complete subordination of the field personnel officer to the will of his line commander who may overlook technical needs in face of immediate operating desirabilities. If the subordination must occur, steps should be taken to secure maximum co-ordination on the technical level and among all distribution activities under the functional supervision of the central distribution agency. Auxiliary agencies which become too specialized and too far removed from reality tend to concern themselves with their profession and forget their reason for existence. The distribution function exists to serve the line, but their ability to function with co-ordinated efficiency must be safeguarded.

5. Over-all interest. The Navy must function as a common team. The goals of distribution must be the over-all good and not group interests. Clientele organizations have their purpose, but it is open to question if they have a proper place in the field of personnel distribution. In such an intraservice program as the flow of personnel, controls by clientele organizations only tend to reduce co-ordination, create pressures, reduce standardization, and create jealousies. This does not mean, however, that airmen should not be assigned to aviation activities; this is a matter of full utilization of skills. It does suggest that the organization for controlling the flow of personnel should be based upon area service rather than clientele service. That the whole team in a given geographic area is more of a basis for personnel placement than breaking it down by types of ships.

Third, co-ordination of both plans and action requires an effective means of control. The basis of control is a personnel accounting system.

The present system is composed of the standardized over-all Navy system and the internal systems of each activity. The accounting system also should provide a foundation for planning. The personnel accounting system must provide the following information:

1. The current status of each activity or basic team.

2. The detailed composition of each basic team with pertinent information on each individual, to permit planning.

3. Means of following-up orders to insure compliance with them.

4. Ready means of displaying priorities of need in order that distribution and placement can be concise, fast, and accurate.

5. Means must exist to reflect every change in status as it occurs or at least as fast as the basic teams can report.

An adequate control system will produce the following results:

1. Correct assigments. The priority system, based on plans for the future, will insure that each person available for assignment is assigned to the correct basic team. This team will have greatest need for the individual's services, and manpower will be most efficiently utilized. Shuffling of personnel will not be necessary if the priority system is based on future needs, and each individual will remain where originally assigned, thus producing greater permanency of personnel.

2. Full use of distribution and placement aids. If the control system indicates the correct classification for each need, the correct person will be placed in each vacant billet. An adequate control system will indicate the specification for each man required. This will permit proper assigments of those available, and it will establish a basis for training programs to assist in rectifying future needs.

3. Correct withdrawals. With detailed information available on the composition of the basic teams and the classifications of each of the members, distribution agencies can withdraw those required for other commitments with accuracy. The right person can be withdrawn from the team which can best afford the loss. A fair withdrawal can be made if the control system reflects the length of time each man has been on board the basic teams.

4. Straight line transfers. An efficient control system will reflect immediately the specific team which requires the services of any specific person by providing data on the qualifications of all available men and the complement or allowance. Orders then can be dispatched immediately assigning each man to a specific team. Pools, except to replace unexpected losses, such as would exist during a war, are unnecessary.

The following chapter will analyze the present distribution system using the criteria suggested in the present chapter to show its advantages and disadvantages.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

With the criteria established, it is possible to reach some judgment on the adequacy of the present distribution system. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the present system and to attempt to suggest modifications which will incorporate all of its good points and reduce its failings to a minimum, if not remove them entirely. Each of the major subdivisions of the criteria will be considered in turn: planning, organization, and control.

Planning

The advantage in planning which the present decentralized position of placement occupies is the close proximity of the type and area commanders to operations, (at least to local operations) and to the basic teams. The type commanders know less about the operations and personnel problems of their basic teams in the forward areas, but the personnel problem is reduced as these teams are filled as close to allowance as possible with men whose enlistments do not expire until the team is scheduled to return to the U.S.A. When possible, a slight excess of key personnel is provided to account for unexpected losses, such as hospitalization. For example, when the writer was personnel officer for ComCruDesPac, one extra chief or first class petty officer in each of the critical ratings was assigned to each division of destroyers because in each of these ratings only one master skill (chief or first class

petty officer) could be provided for each ship. If one became sick the division commander could order the extra man to the ship which suffered the loss on temporary additional duty until the regular person returned. This situation has improved since the Korean emergency, and now most ships have more than one master rating in each of the rating groups which are permitted more than one by the allowance. As the type commander is located in the home port of his force, his personnel officer can have frequent conferences with the officers of the basic teams in the local area and determine their specific needs very carefully. This assists materially in formulation of placement plans. Local problems can be known very quickly and at least a temporary rectification of the problem can be achieved until a more permanent solution can be attained. This advantage of responsiveness to the needs of the basic teams is considerably less in time of war, as the basic teams are not concentrated in one port, and the type commander's personnel officer can only know of needs by correspondence and through his internal accounting system.

The flow of information between BuPers and the fleet commanders is relatively good, due to the small numbers concerned. Telephone, teletype, and personal correspondence permit a relatively high degree of co-ordinated planning between these two levels. These commands deal in large numbers of personnel, and details do not directly affect them. It is the placement level which must face the immediate problem of personnel movement.

Since the close of World War II, personnel distribution planning has been exceedingly difficult. There are three primary causes for this

difficulty. The first cause is the lack of a stable government policy in national preparedness. Rapid expansion has been followed by rapid decline with little advance warning to the military services as to where the axe would fall or where the shot in the arm would take place. This cause is aggravated by the failure of the top line command to keep the distribution central activity, BuPers, informed of anticipated changes. The problem of lack of information from the top line command to permit long range planning existed during World War II, and it did not ease until about the spring of 1945 when expansion diminished.

> A complaint which was often expressed in the Bureau [BuPers] during the course of the war was that the Bureau was not consulted soon enough or adequately enough at the planning stage, and that finished plans were often presented to the Bureau for execution without sufficient regard for personnel and manpower conditions. A typical expression of this point of view was contained in a memorandum addressed to the Assistant Chief of the Bureau on 11 August 1943 by the Director of Enlisted Personnel. He said, "It is imperative that Personnel be considered when strategical plans are being made, rather than when they are being executed, as is largely the case now. To date in the war the bottleneck has been material and everyone has gone on the assumption that as soon as the material is ready, we will have trained personnel ready to operate it. This has worked out fairly satisfactorily due to the rate at which the material implements of war have been produced, but it is apparent that the over-all manpower situation will not permit us to proceed on this assumption. It has reached the point where additional commitments of great magnitude can be undertaken only with a proportional reduction elsewhere. To date no planning agencies have, as far as I have been able to observe, acted on this basis, and it is for this reason that earlier and authoritative representation in planning should be had."[1]

This problem of not knowing of changes until they were ordered executed arose again after the war during the period of rapid demobilization.

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[1] Bureau of Naval Personnel, United States Naval Administration In World War II, First Draft Narrative Prepared Under the General Supervision of the Director of Naval History, (Unpublished), pp. 36-37.

subsequent build-up, economy decline, and then the rapid expansion caused by the Korean emergency. This is not the fault of the distribution system; such deficiencies must be rectified at the policy level.

The second cause of poor planning is the failure of the central distribution agency to provide planning information known to BuPers to the lower distribution levels early enough. Some advance warning should be given before the order of execution is issued. Changes of great import are usually distributed to the lower distribution levels too late to permit adequate planning. An example of this was an AlNav (a message to all Navy activities) which was promulgated during the second decline after World War II in 1949. At the time it was promulgated, the writer was personnel officer for ComCruDesPac. Only a few days were permitted in which it was necessary to formulate plans to compensate for the discharge of eight percent of the type command's personnel, almost 1,800 men, hundreds of whom were on ships in the forward areas. It would require from two to four weeks of travel alone to provide the necessary relief to these ships. The problem was met, but the new problems created required months to rectify. The basic requirements were violated right and left, but there was no alternative. Even in this case the fleet commanders had little advance warning. Where possible, the distribution activities should be provided with advance notice before the order of execution is promulgated. This would permit at least some degree of planning. This difficulty could be rectified within the present system, at least in the majority of cases.

The third cause of poor planning is inherent in the present system itself. There are too many distribution activities to permit easy

co-ordination of planning. The vast number of activities causes many delays. Information sent to the fleet commanders from BuPers must be set into plans, and the requirements of each placement activity determined before detailed information can be sent on. BuPers must deal with over twenty-four separate distribution activities on the next lower level. In the Pacific, there are over thirteen separate placement activities. In the Atlantic, there are even more. The difficulties presented in keeping these numerous and geographically scattered subordinate activities supplied with detailed information in sufficient time to permit the formulation of long range local plans are obvious. The communications and mail problem alone would make co-ordinated planning nearly impossible.

This sprawling, dispersed distribution system with its formal and time consuming means of communication prevents many things from being accomplished. In many cases it is physically impossible for the necessary details to filter through to the placement level with sufficient time remaining for any approach to serious planning. Planning on the placement level is a matter of hand to mouth existence. It seems appropriate to illustrate from actual events.

1. The basic teams receive direct orders from both BuPers and the fleet commanders concerning withdrawals to shore duty. BuPers controls rotation to continental U.S.A. shore duty. The fleet commanders control rotations to forward area shore duty and fleet shore based activities in Hawaii and the West and East Coast U.S.A. These programs are not co-ordinated except that persons are not permitted to be on waiting lists for both. The burden of providing replacements for

withdrawals from the fleet falls upon the type commanders. If replacements are required, the type commanders must provide them from available unassigned personnel or from other basic teams. The only notice received by the type commander is a copy of the orders to the basic team. With administrative delays, this copy usually is received by the type commander's personnel officer a matter of days after the basic team receives the original. The orders are not cleared through the distribution chain because of the delays which would be incurred. An example of the consequences is the case of a certain destroyer. During the week preceeding a major fleet exercise, the destroyer received shore duty orders for all of their petty officer firecontrolmen except one third class. Part of these orders were from BuPers and part from the fleet commander. The first word the type commander's personnel officer had of this was a frantic telephone call from the ship's executive officer. As no planning could possibly account for this, and with the particular rating so critical, no relief was available. Only by a flurry of radio messages was it possible to get the execution of the orders delayed until the completion of the fleet exercise. This could have been avoided if there had been co-ordinated planning on the part of BuPers and the fleet commander or if the orders had been sent via the distribution chain with some leeway as to the date of execution which in itself is co-ordinated planning. The large number of distribution activities and the delays which would be encountered under present conditions preclude this. The basic requirements violated were the factors of slow withdrawals from any one team, withdrawals at propitious times, and provision of timely relief. The result also included some

loss of morale for the men who had orders delayed for a transfer for which they had waited some time. If they had not known about the orders until their return from the fleet exercise, their morale would not have been affected. If a central clearing house had existed to co-ordinate the withdrawals, by timely withdrawal, knowledge of operations, and sufficient coverage to permit early relief, the results would have been better. As it was, relief was obtained from other basic teams not in the type command, however, much delay was encountered because of correspondence delays in the chain of command. Had this all been accomplished in one central placement office, these problems would not have existed.

2. When orders are issued to provide personnel for new or expanding basic teams, they are received on a so-many-of-a-certain-qualification basis. By the time each level develops its plans and the placement officer receives his detailed requirements, little time is available for adequate planning. Often the basic team which can best afford the loss is at sea and could not have the required people at the place required on time, so another basic team must provide them. Later personnel shuffling may be necessary to balance the move. As a result of this lack of time, little advance notice is afforded the basic team affected. Under these conditions it is not always possible to select the most deserving man. If the delays could be removed and greater coverage provided for the placement officers, this problem would be materially reduced. A similar case exists in filling mandatory school quotas. Because of the delays, it is not always possible for the placement officer to select the most suitable candidate. In most cases he chooses a person he can have on his way in time or he makes a report

that none are available which can reach the school in time. This affects planning on the higher levels. Plans are reshuffled and perhaps school quotas go unfilled.

3. It is not feasible for the higher distribution commands to notify their subordinate activities of future receipts because of the number of subordinate activities involved. As a result, the first notice which the type distribution officer receives is that certain people are at a certain place and are available for assignment. He must then make an immediate assignment on the basis of known needs. These needs are the ones known at the moment including anticipated losses due to normal expiration of enlistment. Some placement officers require their basic teams to submit monthly reports listing those persons whose enlistments will shortly expire and who intend to reenlist on board. The personnel accounting system provides the balance of the information. The point to be emphasized is that the placement officers cannot plan their assignments at propitious times, if they have no advance notice as to who will be received and little information as to who will be lost. If advance plans could be made, assignments could be right the first time, and the new man could arrive on board at the right time. As it now stands, a certain person may be assigned to one ship because of current need then perhaps two days later an unplanned loss occurs which creates an even greater need for a man with the same qualifications on another ship. This man or another man has to be reassigned to meet the new need. If the loss could have been anticipated, the new man could have been assigned correctly in the first place, and there would have been no shuffling. Even knowledge of future availabilities might prevent some shuffling

because, perhaps, days later a person of the necessary qualifications would have been available, and the newly created need could have been met by waiting several days and assigning a man with later availability to cover the need. Assigning personnel to basic teams which will not be in port when the man arrives or shortly thereafter results in a waste of manpower. However, as placement officers do not know what personnel they will receive in the future, they cannot take the chance of assigning men currently available to basic teams with low need merely because they will be in port when the man arrives and counting on supplying more important needs with later assignments. As a result, there always are many men waiting for their ships or aircraft units to return to a base. In some cases waiting is necessary, but it can be reduced to a minimum by adequate planning. If the distribution chain were short and planning well co-ordinated, gains and losses could be planned for and controlled, man-hours would be saved and permanency of personnel increased. Spot reliefs for key personnel could become a common practice rather than the exception.

To summarize the evaluation of the planning phase of the present system, its advantages of responsiveness are largely offset by the inability of placement officers to know what the higher distribution authorities have planned for them. Except during stable periods, of which there have been few, planning on the placement level is a short range proposition. Because of the large number of distribution activities involved, co-ordinated planning does not exist to any effective degree.

Organization

The present organizational structure charged with the responsibility of controlling the flow of personnel to and from the fleets is decentralized. The central distribution activity, BuPers, establishes general policy on the utilization and distribution of personnel and controls the flow of manpower between the major subordinate commands. Only in the case of sea-shore rotation and special commitments does it issue orders for men by name. In these cases, orders must be issued by a central agency. The controlling factor for rotation to shore duty is the length of time a particular person has served consecutively at sea. The controlling factor on orders for special commitments is the specialized nature of a particular person's qualifications. In other cases men are withdrawn from the fleets on a so-many-of-a-certain qualification basis. BuPers orders personnel to the fleets in numbers depending upon needs and strives to keep them in balance. Names are given in ordering people to the fleets except in the case of large groups in the lower pay grades, but this is done for administrative reasons. The important factor is their qualifications and their location. After men are ordered to a particular fleet command (made available, to be exact), it is assumed that they will be distributed fairly within the command by the fleet commander. This responsibility is delegated to the fleet commanders.

The fleet commanders perform a similar function within their respective fleets. They control the flow of personnel between the type and area commands. They have their sea-shore rotation programs and special commitments of a specialized nature. They also formulate more

detailed policies for distribution within the fleets. Personnel made available to the fleet commander by BuPers are in turn made available to the type and area commanders with a similar assumption as to fair distribution and placement. Quotas for withdrawals are prorated amongst the type and area commanders depending upon who can best afford the loss. The gross numbers in each rating are used, neither individual teams nor their specific locations at the time are considered.

To the area and type commanders is delegated the responsibility of placing new personnel in the basic teams and withdrawing personnel from the teams for new commitments. Until about 1948, some type commanders were not performing full placement functions. They were allotting the new men to the division or unit commanders for further assignment to specific basic teams. The unit commanders were supposed to keep their teams in balance and fill withdrawal quotas as specified by the type commander. The type commander maintained gross records on the strength of each unit by ratings. This method was highly undesirable, and was changed shortly after the writer became personnel officer of CruDesPac in that type command. Briefly the disadvantages were as follows:

1. Placement was inefficient, as the unit commanders did not have adequately trained personnel for placement. Politics and shuffling was a common occurrence.

2. The unit commander was too far from the source of supply and because of geographic dispersion co-ordination with the type commander was difficult. Advance notice of new personnel allotments was impossible because of the number involved and mail delays.

3. When units were split, that is, operating in different areas, additional transportation was excessive.

4. Straight line transfers were impossible because the magnitude of traffic would clog communications and the mails were too slow. The unit commander did not know what he was going to receive until a new man reported on board the flag ship.

5. Withdrawals had to be by numbers, which amplified the numbers in the permanent corps of transients. Shuffling between the unit's ships to adjust for losses and delays were the rule. Withdrawals by the type commander could not be by name as the type commander never knew the unit commanders' detailed plans and vice versa.

In brief, this system was very inefficient and costly, and the placement was poor. When the placement function was centralized in the type commander's personnel office, the delays on this level were removed and co-ordinated action on the type command level was no problem. Straight line transfers were used exclusively, except where it was desirable to bring the man aboard the flagship to determine qualifications more closely. This was the exception, however. Placement was much more efficient because highly trained staffs devoted all their time to studying the problems of the various operating units. Persons were ordered directly to the port in which the ship would be when they arrived for duty. This saved productive man-hours. Less pressure was put on the placement office as the type commander's higher position saved some of it. As the type commander was closer to the source of supply, earlier information was received, and co-ordination with the higher distribution activities was easier but still far from the desirable minimum.

There are many organization problems caused by the present decentralized structure. These recently have been recognized officially by BuPers. The delays and the resulting large amount of non-productive personnel piling up in the receiving stations have forced action for reducing the distribution chain. The number of steps between original distribution and placement is the major cause of difficulty. BuPers has recently proposed a plan to the fleet commanders based on this premise.[2] This plan proposes bringing the type commander's personnel officers to the fleet personnel distribution office. This would combine fleet distribution and placement physically in one office.

> 67,302 Reservists were assigned by BuPers in the first 3 months of the Korean conflict. The saving due to reducing delays would have amounted to 134,604 man days for this period or 1,475 man years. This in effect would man an additional six destroyers or their equivalent.[3]

The letters which proposed this plan listed the following advantages:

1. This system would be used in the event of mobilization.
2. The type commander's personnel officer would be at the fleet's source of supply and would have immediate knowledge of what, where, when, and how many men were available.
3. The saving in manpower and money by reducing the delays in the assignment of personnel.
4. Reduction in communications.
5. Reduction in the numbers of men in receiving stations as they are overloaded to the breaking point.

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[2] BuPers letter of 26 December 1950 to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. A similar letter was sent to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet.

[3] Ibid., p. 2.

6. More efficient and prompt assignments.

The organization is now unwieldy and widely dispersed. The point of these letters is the apparent need for greater co-ordinated action which would mean faster action. The major disadvantages of the present system will be discussed in turn; they all seem to occur on the placement level.

1. Lack of area coverage. As the type commands are organized on a clientele basis rather than on area basis, perhaps only one or two basic teams will be operating in a given area with basic teams of other type commands. If any unexpected loss occurs, of a critical nature, replacement can be provided by only two methods and both are time consuming. The replacement can be transported from another of the type command's basic teams in another area. Otherwise, request for assistance must be made to the fleet commander, who must order relief from another type command, which has a basic team in the area, and which can afford a loss. If this all could have been done in one office which controlled all the basic teams in the given area, action could have been completed in a matter of hours.

2. Less selectivity. If a withdrawal has to be made, the more basic teams which are available to draw from, the greater the selection offered. As the majority of the fleet's basic teams are highly mobile, the placement officer may not be able to make an efficient selection due to the geographic location of his teams at the moment. If he had greater coverage, there would be a greater chance of having a suitable point of withdrawal at the place desired. As it is, the basic requirements are frequently violated. More travel, delay, and future shuffling may

be the result. Less chance of effective selection also results.

3. Lack of transportation co-ordination. With the large number of placement activities, people have to be ordered with little regard for the transportation which may be available for them. It is impossible for all the placement activities to control transportation space quotas. People must wait in receiving stations until local authorities provide the necessary transportation space. If it were possible to have transportation facilities co-ordinated with the flow of personnel, considerable productivity could be salvaged. The present extensive system would not permit this.

4. Lack of co-ordination between placement agencies. Little co-ordination exists between placement agencies as they are physically separated, under separate line commanders, and subject to the delays encountered by the official use of the chain of command. Each is concerned with the problems of its clientele, and as there is no common goal, jealousies exist. Co-ordinated action with the fleet commander is time consuming because of the communications and mail problem. The fleet commanders do the best they can to co-ordinate action, but they are faced with a difficult situation. The plan proposed by BuPers mentioned above to co-ordinate all action in one office would be a great step in alleviating these problems. The only deterring effect will be the fact each personnel officer will still be primarily responsible to his type commander, frictions and delays will result. In brief, there will still be many "fingers in the pot." Maximum co-ordination cannot be achieved until a common purpose dictates the course of action rather than partisan representation.

5. Delays due to the length of the chain. The system proposed by BuPers is primarily aimed at eliminating assignment delays, which have proved embarrassing in recent months. These have previously been discussed, but it is desirable to reemphasize the point that the less steps there are in placement, the less will be the loss of productivity of manpower.

6. Excessive red tape. Much time is consumed in communications and correspondence if one is to achieve co-ordination. This is primarily due to the physical distance between distribution activities, and the responsibility of each distribution activity to different line commands. The BuPers proposed change will eliminate the former, but because of the retention of the latter, there will be much correspondence between the type commanders and their personnel officers. This can be eleviated only by organizing placement on a common purpose basis.

7. Pressures. When a relatively junior officer serves as personnel officer to the type commander, he is subject to considerable pressure from the staff and senior line officers of the type command. Even with the complete backing of the type commander, he still must be attentive to the demands of each senior line officer who visits his office. Due to the career system in the Navy, he may serve under one of these officers at a later date, and there is nothing more dear to a commodore's or captain's heart than the certain people he wants on his staff, on his ship, or in his aviation unit. The type commander's personnel officer can be easily singled out for attack if any personnel problems develop. The personnel officer may be doing the best he can with what is available, but this is not considered when someone does not

have what he wants. When all goes well, the personnel officer is forgotten, but let a personnel problem arise, and he soon is blamed. On higher personnel officer's staffs, the workers lose their individual position and take up a corporate identity. The personnel officer, himself, has sufficient rank to discourage all pressures except from his seniors, and they are few. They are supposed to have broader insight into the whole problem and should be more understanding.

In all, the system does not lead to the degree of co-ordination of action desired. During war, a high degree of co-ordination is necessary for success. This applies to all fields of military activity. BuPers is convinced that a greater co-ordination is necessary than now exists.

Control

The present means of controlling distribution is considered very efficient. The Navy's accounting system is as good as human errors permit. The necessary information is available to all distribution activities, however, there are delays in providing the necessary information. When reports are received, they are usually weeks behind the actual picture. This could be decreased if PAMI's were located at each placement activity. This would also eliminate additional copies of reports from basic teams being sent to the placement activity for the maintenance of internal accounting systems which presently are required. The disadvantage to such an idea is the cost involved. The electric machine installations require a considerable amount of work to keep them busy. Because of the large number of placement activities, it is doubtful if locating one installation at each activity would pay.

Another possibility would be a teletype report system from forward areas to one central PAMI for the fleet, using the present mailing system for local teams. With a teletype report system, the basic teams in the forward areas could send their personnel diaries to a PAMI field office in the area. The information would then be coded electrically and sent to the central fleet PAMI by teletype. This would reduce the delays in receiving reports by mail from the forward areas. The use of a central PAMI for the fleet would tie in with the idea of having all fleet distribution and placement in one office. The two could be combined in one activity. As it stands, the present system of personnel accounting is satisfactory within limits. There are delays, but the majority of delays could be rectified by the use of a central fleet distribution and placement office. The internal accounting systems do keep local records up-to-date. Most delays in reports from the forward areas are of minor consequence, as losses of key persons are usually reported to the type commander by radio message anyway. The basic teams are in good condition when sent forward, at least if it is at all possible, and the minor losses are not of great importance. Major losses such as might occur during war, make the problem of greater importance for the future in many ways. Large losses must be anticipated and means established to replace them whether by withdrawals from other teams or by the use of manpower pools. The need for closer co-ordination and faster reporting must be considered.

The internal accounting systems are not standardized. Each type command personnel office uses its own system. The system outlined in Chapter IV is an example of a good system. They may vary in method, but the fundamental goal is the same in all systems of this nature,

that of maintaining the command's status up-to-the-minute.

Assignments are fairly accurate, depending upon the individuals in the distribution offices. Greater accuracy should be expected when the results of billet analysis are completed. Some improvement in the job codes is possible, to assist in better placement. It is believed that the present job codes are too general and do not tell enough about the person to be assigned. The commanding officers of the basic teams do not pay enough attention to assigning them accurately to their men either. In many cases they cover a broad field but do not give any idea as to proficiency in that field. The placement officer has to judge the level of proficiency by the person's pay grade. This is not always indicative of what particular job a man can do. Some people fully qualified for advancement cannot be advanced due to a lack of quota. The placement officer would like to know this as it may permit him to assign a person who can do the job even though he does not have the rating the billet calls for. The important thing is performance. What a man has on his arm is not always important. This certainly is a subject for future study.

The personnel accounting system provides sufficient information for name withdrawals, but they are not always used because the number quotas are easier and less pressure is brought to bear. This is not the fault of the system itself.

Sufficient information is available in availability reports to use straight line transfers. They can and should be used. With adequate internal accounting, the personnel diaries will tell when each person reports on board his basic team in compliance with the orders. Follow-up

procedures must be used if discrepancies are shown.

Summary

After careful study and years of experience, the writer feels that the present system is not the best which can be devised. It is firmly believed that the disadvantages far outweigh the advantages. BuPers, itself, admits that there would have to be a change in case of war. The fundamental requirement of having a system which will work efficiently in both war and peace is not met by the present system. In the next chapter the writer will attempt to incorporate all the advantages of the present system and suggest how all the disadvantages can be removed in a new system. In the last chapter, conclusions on the entire study will be drawn with recommendations as to what should be done and how it can be accomplished.

CHAPTER VII

A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE EXISTING DIFFICULTIES

The study up to this point suggests that solution to the present difficulties lies in the provision of greater co-ordination of planning, action, and control. To gain this, it seems apparent that some centralization of the placement process must take place. This does not mean that complete centralization is the answer. It does mean that some shortening of the lines of intercommunication and upgrading of control levels for this function is a step in the right direction. The centralization of placement on the fleet level rather than on the type and area command level has high face validity. The area commands are now organized on the area principle, but as ships and aircraft of the type commands do operate in these areas also, the principle of area coverage is not complete. The area commands are part of the fleet and, therefore, must be included in any centralization of placement on the fleet level. Any system designed to promote co-ordination of the placement function must be all-inclusive of those in a given geographic area. Any idea of centralizing placement in geographic areas below the fleet level must be overruled as ships and aircraft move between the various areas of the ocean. This lack of continuity would make administration difficult and would not improve the present situation. Although, ships and aircraft may move between the jurisdictions of the two great fleets, it is not a frequent occurance due to the continental land masses and the principle of guarding the two great sea approaches to our nation.

As centralization of the placement function in BuPers would not be practical due to the magnitude of the problem and remoteness from at least the Pacific Fleet, and the idea of sub-areas in the fleet is also overruled, the answer appears to be centralization on the fleet level to rectify the present situation. A solution will be attempted on this premise. A system must be devised which will incorporate all the present advantages as near as possible. It also must be feasible under existing power forces.

The Fundamentals of the Proposal

In an organization such as the Navy which has a common interchangeable human factor, its manpower, a central personnel agency must exist. This requirement is now satisfied by BuPers. This central agency must establish a uniform distribution policy, as standardization is necessary in an organization with a common purpose and with interchangeable human factors. Such policies must control the flow of personnel, as it is a physical and practical necessity that it be controlled. As there will be a flow of personnel between the major subordinate commands and as it is necessary to distribute recruits, the central agency must perform this function. Due to the complexity of the placement problem, it is doubtful that actual placement could be performed by the central agency, BuPers, without an excessively large organization and serious disruption of command responsibility. The problem is complicated by the physical distance of BuPers from the many subordinate commands and the basic teams. Some field organization is essential, but its structure must be such as to permit maximum co-ordination. The location of responsibility for placement on the fleet command level appears to be the best solution. Although BuPers

would have numerous shore activities to deal with, there would only be two fleet placement activities to co-ordinate. As the fleets are the major utilizers of personnel, this reduced span of control would be a considerable advantage. The only co-ordination problem which would then exist in fleet placement, in a given fleet itself, would be that between the fleet line command and the fleet's central placement office.

There are two principal methods by which BuPers could distribute the personnel available in the receiving stations, the training commands, schools, and those whose shore duty tour has expired. The first is the present method whereby each man (or groups of men) is assigned specifically to some subordinate command for further assigment. The second method would be the automatic allocation of all persons available in each supply point to one or the other fleet central placement office. For example, all the recruits graduating from the training center at San Diego, California could automatically be made available to the Pacific Fleet Placement Office, those in Bainbridge, Maryland to the Atlantic Fleet Placement Office, etc. This would reduce delay and minimize the necessity for communications between BuPers and the supply points. An information copy of the orders of those so allocated could be airmailed to BuPers each day. As BuPers plans the input into the training centers, controls school quotas, and has a record indicating when each man's shore duty tour expires, its planning, in effect, would control the input into each fleet. The shore activities should receive their input from the sea-shore rotation program, at least where possible. The army of specialists, arising during war, who are allergic to duty at sea will have to be assigned to the shore activities directly by BuPers. These could be singled out at the receiving stations. If it appears that the fleets will get out of balance, then

specific orders from BuPers can divert specific personnel from any one source until the balance is corrected.

BuPers shore duty orders should be sent to the fleet's central placement office, with some leeway as to time of execution. This will permit the placement office to plan a relief, if required, and issue the necessary orders at the propitious time.

Mandatory school quotas should be sent to the fleet's central placement office well in advance of reporting dates in order that withdrawals can be accomplished efficiently and replacements can be effective.

The crux of the suggested change is the fleet central placement office. This office would replace all the type and area commanders' present placement functions and would include the present fleet distribution function. All placement would be unified geographically. A major question which arises at this point is whether the fleet's central placement office should be directly under the fleet commander, under the military control of the fleet commander with BuPers exercising management control, or directly under BuPers as its field branch office. The first alternative appears most feasible. It would maintain responsiveness to the line command. The fleet personnel is very much a concern of the fleet commander, and under the major policies of administration established by BuPers, he should have leeway in deciding the actual placement of the individuals within his command. The fleet commander's battle plans depend a great deal on the personnel status of his basic teams. Therefore, in order that no hindrance exist to the effective discharge of his responsibilities, he must control the placement phase of distribution. It may be said that the type commanders and task force commanders have a similar interest in their personnel. This is true in varying degrees. The type commander is an administrative

commander and does not function as a battle commander in most cases, therefore, his main professional interest in the placement function is the administrative and training performance of his clientele and the political fact that he now controls placement. The task force commander could not control placement as the membership of his force will change. There could be no continuity of administrative function required in placement. Therefore, the only possibility of further decentralization is the existing system and the disadvantages of this seem to outweigh the advantages.

The fleet commander is familiar enough with the requirements of his basic teams in the battle plan to determine the personnel priorities which must be established. Centralization of placement on the fleet level would not prevent the necessary control over personnel administration by each line commander. It would merely centralize the control over the rotation of personnel in order to gain the advantages of centralized planning and action.

The fleet's central placement office should be located at a key geographic point, on each coast of the U.S.A. It should be physically far enough from the naval activity center to prevent destruction. The factors important to the determination of the location are close proximity to the following:

1. Centers of embarkation.
2. Training centers.
3. Centers of basic team operations.
4. Repair centers.
5. Communications centers.

For the West Coast, San Francisco or San Diego are recommended, and for the

East Coast, Newport or Norfolk.

Each office should have close liaison with the receiving stations, training centers, schools, pre-commissioning centers, shipyards, transport services, and movement report centers of respective coasts and forward area counterparts. It must also be in close liaison with the fleet's subordinate line commanders. There should be close co-ordination between the two centers and BuPers in technical matters.

The fleet's central placement office should have the fleet PAMI incorporated in its organization. This would facilitate the use of the Navy's Personnel Accounting System in the placement function. To facilitate representation, on the spot action, and management of manpower pools, an area office should be located in each important forward area center. These area offices should be under the management control of the central fleet placement office and should provide a receiving station and area PAMI reporting activity in each important area of operation. Teletype communications between these area offices and the central office should be provided.

Organization of the Fleet Central Placement Office

An Assistant Fleet Personnel Officer for Distribution should be in charge of the Fleet's Central Placement Office. He should serve under the direction of the Fleet Personnel Officer who should be attached to the staff of the fleet or service force commander. Under the basic plans established by the Fleet Personnel Officer, the Assistant Fleet Personnel Officer for Distribution should determine detailed plans and control the placement and withdrawal of personnel from the basic teams of the fleet. He should, at least, hold the rank of a senior Captain to prevent

unauthorized pressures upon the placement function. He should be assisted by officers with adequate fleet experience and personnel training. The office might be divided into the following departments:

1. Placement Control.
2. Administration.
3. Schools.
4. Transportation.
5. Personnel Accounting.

The Placement Control Department would be the largest of the departments. The Placement Control Officer would be the senior assistant to the Assistant Personnel Officer. He would be responsible for the formulation of placement plans and the control of placement and withdrawals from the basic teams of the fleet in accordance with the policies and priorities established by the fleet commander and BuPers. The functions of this department might be distributed amongst various desks and sections as follows:

1. The Central Distribution Desk.
2. The Placement Desks.
    a) Aviation.
    b) Submarine.
    c) Surface Combat.
    d) Amphibious.
    e) Shore Activities.
    f) Training Activities.
    g) Auxiliaries.
    h) New Construction.
    i) Pool Control.
3. Order Desk.
4. Status Section.
5. Fleet-Administered Shore-Duty Desk.
6. BuPers Shore-Duty Clearance Desk.
7. Fleet Movements Section.

The function of the Central Distribution Desk would be similar to that of the present fleet distribution organization. This desk would channel the incoming flow of information on personnel availabilities to the various

placement desks in accordance with established priority plans and co-ordinate the withdrawal of personnel with the placement desks. More on the subject of this desk and the other desks will be given when the methodology of the placement function is discussed.

The placement desks could be organized in a manner similar to those now used in the type commands. This type of organization has the advantage permitting each placement desk staff to be highly cognizant of the problems of a particular type of basic team. For example, an aviation officer should be at the Aviation Placement Desk and should control the personnel flow in and out of aviation basic teams, a submarine officer should be at the Submarine Placement Desk, an officer well experienced in destroyers and cruisers should be at the Surface Combat Placement Desk, etc. Although such organization may seem to emphasize representation of clientele, experience in the peculiar problems of different types of basic teams is necessary for effective placement. Those in charge of all desks would report solely to the Placement Control Officer, have a common purpose - the fleet - and be closely co-ordinated. All the desks should be physically located in one room. The only necessary communication is oral. Informal conferences could quickly decide mutual problems. Final decisions in questions where mutual agreement could not be reached would rest with the Placement Control Officer. Each of these desks would assign and withdraw personnel from their basic teams in accordance with the co-ordinated plan.

The Order Desk would provide for the common function of issuance and receipt of orders. Incoming availability reports and quotas for personnel would be transcribed on common forms and sent to the central distribution desk. A copy of the form would be received from each placement desk which

had been allocated personnel or given a withdrawal quota by the Central Distribution Desk. On each copy would be the assignment or point of withdrawal of each man concerned. This desk could then answer each availability report or issue the necessary orders for withdrawals in accordance with the instructions written on each copy of the form.

The Status Section would be responsible for maintaining the internal accounting and display systems up-to-date. It would submit a priority sheet to the Central Distribution Desk each morning showing the priorities for assignment and withdrawal for each placement desk. It would provide information necessary to keep the status boards of each placement desk up-to-date. In order to maintain the internal accounting and display system, close co-ordination is necessary both with the personnel accounting department and the Order Desk. The status of each basic team of the fleet should be shown according to the latest report received. It would also be necessary for this section to follow-up all orders issued in order to insure compliance.

The Fleet-Administered Shore-Duty Desk would maintain the waiting lists on men who have requested fleet administered shore duty and, working in close co-ordination with the Shore Activities Placement Desk and other placement desks, would request the Order Desk to issue the necessary orders to fleet personnel on these waiting lists to meet the planned needs of the Shore Activities Placement Desk. If there are insufficient persons available from the Fleet-Administered Shore-Duty Desk, additional men would have to be secured from the Central Distribution Desk.

The BuPers Shore Duty Clearance Desk would receive the BuPers orders for fleet personnel going to shore duty. By working in close co-ordination

with the placement desks concerned with each order, the propitious time of movement within the allowed limits could be determined, and an order request sent to the Order Desk with the date for issuance and a date for compliance. By working in close co-ordination with the placement desks, spot reliefs could be arranged by the latter in many cases in ample time, if required.

The Fleet Movements Section would, by keeping in close liaison with the fleet operations and movement reports centers, keep the placement officers informed upon the movement details of the basic teams for which they are responsible. This is necessary in order that orders place the right man at the right place at the right time. The future movements of each basic team must be taken into account in efficient placement and removal of personnel. This information must be available as far into the future as is possible to determine it.

The Administrative Department would handle the administrative correspondence and communications of the office, other than the availability reports and the orders. It would maintain the central files, prepare the necessary correspondence for the other departments, handle the mailing and outgoing administrative communications. In addition to this, it would administer the housekeeping needs of the office.

The Transportation Department would receive air and surface transportation quotas and by working in co-ordination with the placement desks insure that the most expeditious means of transportation would be available at a point of embarkation. The objective is to insure that transportation is available for persons reporting to receiving stations for movement to their respective basic teams or for return to the continental U.S.A. Key

individuals must receive top transportation priority. The transportation of officers could be handled either by this department or by the Naval Districts. If it were to be arranged by this department, adequate information from BuPers on arrivals and withdrawals would be required.

The Schools Department would fill mandatory quotas assigned to the fleet by BuPers for schools. By working in co-ordination with the placement control department, the most effective withdrawals from the basic teams could be arranged. This department would also administer the fleet's optional school quotas and assign these quotas to the basic teams in accordance with their requests. It is considered advisable that the quotas for fleet schools be handled locally. The local office of the fleet's training command in each area where the fleet schools are located should assign quotas, upon the requests of the basic teams which are going to be in the specific area.

The Personnel Accounting Department is the fleet's central PAMI. Reports of changes would be received from the sub-offices in each area. Basic teams on the coast concerned would mail their reports directly to this department. Here normal PAMI functions would be conducted for the fleet, reports to higher commands made-up, and the records maintained. This department would work in co-ordination with the Status Section previously discussed to provide the necessary information on changes in the basic teams to maintain the internal accounting system.

The sub-offices or area offices would act as the central office's representative in each area. By keeping in contact with the basic teams in each of their areas, they could keep the central office informed of specific personnel problems which the records do not reveal. Commanding

officers and executive officers would be free to discuss their problems with the area officer at any time. This would provide more expeditious response to the needs of line commands. As such offices would be organized on an area basis, they should maintain local records on each basic team in their area. If any basic team moves to another area, their personnel records should be forwarded to the new area office. If the central office were destroyed, each area could administer the needs of its basic teams until a new central office was functioning. If any area office were destroyed, the central office could take over its function until a new area office was functioning. By use of a standardized accounting system for internal records, this mutual assistance could be attained. Each area office could control the manpower pool in the area, act as the area's receiving station, and perform the function of receiving and transmitting the personnel accounting reports from the basic teams in the area to the central office. When the reports were received, the area's internal accounting system could be corrected at the same time they were being relayed to the central office. Each area office should have authority to correct emergency situations in the area by immediate transfers from the area pool or another basic team in the area with a report of the action taken to the central office. Routine placement could be performed by the central office. This would provide for on-the-spot action. Routine action already consummated by the central office could be revised after the emergency transfer report was received from the area office. Each area office would have to be informed by mail, by a coded report of action taken in the central office, where basic teams of their area were concerned. They would have to receive a copy of any transfers ordered from basic teams

in their area and a report of what persons had been ordered to each of their basic teams and the estimated date of arrival.

Methodology

An internal accounting system is a fundamental requisite of a placement system. It is necessary to have an up-to-date visual display of the status of each basic team concerned. Without this current status display, the daily action required to fulfill plans cannot be controlled adequately. In order to set up the initial display for any given basic team, the latest Monthly Distribution Report (Pers 82-31) would be required.[1] All orders of personnel to and from this team, which have not been accounted for in this report, would have to be considered as actual gains and losses for accounting purposes. All daily personnel diaries submitted since the date of the Activity Distribution Report would have to be perused to determine other unknown gains, losses, or changes in qualifications. The result would be the current status for the basic team. Input and withdrawals could then be based on a comparison between the distribution plans and this current status. If the numbers on board in any given rating or rate are less than planned, input is required. If greater, withdrawal or normal attrition is the proper recourse. By normal attrition is meant that routine losses are permitted to occur without replacement. In peacetime, expirations of enlistment must be accounted for. It has been found desirable by the writer to require each basic team to submit a periodic report listing anticipated reenlistments as far in the future as known. This would prevent replacement of people who intend to

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[1] See page twenty for a description of this report.

reenlist on board and permit planning of reliefs for expected losses, if required. After the current status is determined, the next problem is to keep it up-to-date at all times. This can be accomplished by recording each gain or loss ordered by the office from the internal records. The unplanned changes such as school returnees, hospitalization, promotion, demotion, discharge for reasons other than expiration of enlistment, corrections for past accounting errors, etc., must be obtained from the personnel diaries. The maintenance of the current status would be the function of the Status Section.

The Navy's personnel accounting system is excellent for the purpose for which it was devised, but for placement, it must be supplemented by an internal accounting system. The Navy accounting system shows the status up to the last monthly report. More information is required for the placement function. Action already taken must be accounted for in filling the balance of the plans. A person ordered to a basic team will not be reflected in the PAMI report until the month following the date he reports on board. The placement officer must account for him, however, the minute the orders are issued.

An important part of current status is the manner in which it is displayed before the placement officer. It must be concise, clear, complete, and confinable to a small area. A system comparable to that described in Chapter IV which was devised for ComCruDesPac by the writer is recommended, as it fills all the requirements. In order that the display can be maintained current and follow-up procedures on issued orders can be used, the Status Section must provide a daily report on all changes from the daily diaries each day. When the placement officer assigns a person to a basic

team, he enters a green number 1 peg or increases the present peg in number by one in the fourth-fifth vertical row of holes opposite the specific qualification and reduces the priority designator by one. A personnelman at the desk enters the necessary information on the card of the given basic team from the Kardex. This information is transcribed from the copy of the order form before it is sent to the Order Desk. A withdrawal from any basic team is subtracted from the on board count of the display board, the priority designator increased by one if necessary, and a notation of the order number and the destination placed on the line containing the person's name in the Current Activity Distribution Report of that team.

The information as to status and plans should be projected on the display boards in the same manner as described in Chapter IV. In wartime, information on anticipated losses due to expiration of enlistments would not be required. Information on future planned withdrawals could be located in a special Kardex. When the individuals have been selected, the names, ratings, and the basic team to which each person is presently attached could be entered on a project card with the dates the orders must be issued. Planned withdrawals would be removed from the display boards' on board count, and a suitable entry placed on the line of each person's name in the respective Activity Distribution Reports. When orders are issued, another entry on the lines will indicate that each man concerned has now been ordered. The on-order Kardex would be similar to that described in Chapter IV. Each card in this Kardex would contain the following information:

1. The name or number of persons of a given qualification.
2. The rating or rate.
3. The Navy job codes.
4. Where ordered from.

5. Estimated date of arrival on board.
6. The order file number.
7. The date the person or persons actually report on board (entered from the basic team's personnel diary).

When complements and allowances are determined by job code rather than by rating, the files of the display boards must be rearranged by job code. This revives the problem previously discussed of the need for more reflective job codes. If a person is a second class petty officer but can perform efficiently in the billet of a first class petty officer of the same qualification group, this information is valuable to the placement officer. He is more interested in providing a person who can meet the need on the job than in the administrative disparity between pay grades and performance ability.

The Status Section would have two sources of information to maintain the displays and the daily priority report. The first is the daily summary of unexpected gains, losses, and changes in qualification entered in the daily personnel diaries which are compiled by the Personnel Accounting Department on each basic team from those diaries received during the previous day. The second is the copies of all orders issued by the Order Desk. A possible third source of information would exist in the form of correspondence and radio messages from the basic teams which might give advance information before the daily personnel diaries are received. All of this information would be used to maintain the office's displays and reports up-to-date.

The daily account for each placement desk would be the running balance of masters and journeymen in each rating and each group of rates. This information would be used to prepare the daily priority report submitted to the central distribution desk each morning. This information

subtracted from the priority base would determine the priority designator for the placement desks in each rating and rate group. The priority base is the fleet's percentage of allowance (or complement if used) applied to the allowance (or complement if used) of the particular placement desk. This is what normal input and withdrawal should be based upon. An example will illustrate the means by which each priority designator is determined.

Example:

The Surface Combat Placement Desk has a total allowance for 500 master electrician's mates in its basic teams. The fleet percentage of allowance is 50 percent.

Allowance	-	500
Fleet percentage	-	50%
Priority base figure	-	250
On board	-	227
Priority designator	-	23

The example indicates that the Surface Combat Desk has a shortage of 23 master electrician's mates when compared with the fleet. Each placement desk's priority designator for each rating group and rate would be indicated on the daily priority sheet. This would serve as a guide to the Central Distribution Officer in assigning available men and withdrawals to the various placement desks in routine distribution. Special priorities could be assigned over and above the routine priorities and will be discussed later in the chapter.

A sample daily priority report for use during the period where rating groups and naval job codes are used is shown on page one hundred thirty-nine. This method would be used at present. The sample is the page for the Boatswain's Mate rating group (BM). The placement desks are

RE (01) Date 10 June 1951

1. Rating Control:

	AV	SS	AM	SA	TA	AX	SC	MC
	300	350	339	310	214	271	521	71
H	-	41	-	-	6	10	24	21
6-1								20

	AV	SS	AM	SA	TA	AX	SC	MC
	910	1051	912	977	[illegible]	[illegible]	1621	241
	34	10	12	10	7	12	-	31
I	31							28
2-3 DS								

2. Special priorities:

Jo (Den) NC-3 ///

3. Special NJC's

NJC		AV	SS	AM	SA	TA	AX	SC	MD
0111	a	3	-	-	40	-	85	5	5
	o	3			40		83	4	4
									1
0112	a	5	-	-	31	-	41	4	3
	o	5			27		39	3	3
0113	a								
	o								
0114	a								
	o								
0115	a								
	o								
0116	a								
	o								
0117	a								
	o								
0119	a								
	o								
0131	a								
	o								
0132	a								
	o								

Each page is of sufficient width to include all special job codes in the rating group. All pages are of standard width and length to permit enclosure in a loose-leaf binder.

[illegible] PAGE OF THE DAILY PRIORITY REPORT

indicated by the following abbreviations:

Placement Desk	Abbreviation
Aviation	AV
Submarine	SS
Surface Combat	SC
Amphibious	AM
Shore Activities	SA
Training Activities	TA
Auxiliaries	AX
New Construction	NC

The rating control section (1) is divided into two parts. The first is for the master boatswain's mates, the chief and the first class petty officers of the rating. The second is for the journeyman boatswain's mates, the second and third class petty officers of the rating and the personnel in pay grades 2 and 3 who are designated in the rating. This division of the rating group is done for practical reasons in mass distribution. The actual pay grades are considered at the placement desks. The law of averages will provide an even distribution. If placement does come out of balance, a note on the page can enable the personnelman to correct it in short order.

In practice it appears that the greatest cleavage in skill lies between the first and second class petty officers. This first section is necessary, as complements and allowances are primarily based upon ratings and not job codes. The first number in each column and in each part of section one is the over-all allowance (or complement if used) for the particular placement desk. The second number is the priority designator. A dash indicates that the desk is at or above the fleet percentage of allowance (or complement if used) in the particular division of the rating group. Section two is for special priorities assigned by the Placement Control Officer. These are written in at the Central Distribution Desk

as instructed and must be filled first before routine priorities are filled. If these special priorities are not filled during a given day and the Placement Control Officer does not order withdrawals from other placement desks, the balance of the special need not yet filled is carried over to the next day's daily priority report. The third section is a breakdown of the special Navy job codes which may be indicated in allowances (or complements if used) or have proved necessary in practice and cannot be filled by persons of general experience. The top number in each column indicates the allowance (or complement if used) of the particular specialty. The second number indicates the actual on board count of the desk from the daily running balance.

Only the job codes 0111 (deck rigger, heavy weight handling) and 0112 (cargo handler, rigger) have been filled in on the sample sheet for purposes of illustration. Two entries have been made on the sample page to indicate two sample transactions. First, a Chief Boatswain's Mate (NJC 0111) was received for assignment. The Central Distribution Desk assigned him to the New Construction Placement Desk. The priority designator of the desk was reduced by one in section one and a tally one was entered in the NJC 0111 of the desk in section three. Next, six journeymen boatswain's mates with general qualifications were available for assignment. As there was a write-in entry in section two for three such qualifications for the New Construction Desk, these were assigned first and talleyed off. An entry was made in section one. The other three were made available to the Aviation Desk and the appropriate entry made in section one. As there were no special job codes involved, no entry was made in section three for these six journeymen.

When allowances (and complements) are established by job codes, the daily priority report must be revised. Section one would not be required. Section three would be expanded to include all job codes of the rating group. Priority designators would replace the on-board count numbers. There would be a separate page for each rating group and rate in the fleet in both cases in a similar manner as described for the sample shown.

When sufficient men were available to have all basic teams at complement, pools could be established in the forward areas. The daily priority report could be dispensed with as it would not be required to distribute the flow. Placement desks could requisition to replace losses for their basic teams from the continental U.S.A. from the Central Distribution Desk. Personnel could be requisitioned from the Pool Control Desk for replacements in the forward areas.

A copy of the daily priority report is submitted to the Placement Control Officer each day in order that he may be kept abreast of the personnel situation and direct such special priorities and withdrawals as may be necessary to meet the plans.

Each placement desk would have a personnelman assigned to the task of maintaining current the status display boards and the Activity Distribution Reports of each basic team. The reports from the Status Section combined with information from the outgoing orders would provide the necessary information to accomplish this function.

Planning

In order for the placement office to formulate the necessary distribution plans, two external sources of information are required. The Fleet Personnel Officer must keep the office informed as to operational

and new construction requirements and priorities regarding the supply of personnel. Those anticipated needs which cannot be filled from the assignment of personnel input from external sources will have to be satisfied by intra-fleet transfers. The greater the advance notice provided the less resort to intra-fleet transfers will be required. The other source of information is BuPers, which should provide the following information insofar as possible:

1. Advance information on the people who are to be made available to the fleet.
2. Anticipated withdrawals other than to normal sea-shore rotation which have already been accounted for.
3. Advance copies of authorizations for advancement in rating.
4. Copies of all directives which in any way influence personnel needs, qualifications, or movement. Advance information is always desirable before promulgation to the Navy.

With this information, plans for controlling the flow of personnel can be determined by the Assistant Fleet Personnel Officer and his staff. The assignment of specific persons can be determined in advance, permitting future commitments to be filled from future supplies insofar as may be practical. The future withdrawals from the fleet's basic teams to meet future commitments either within or without the fleet can be accounted for. This will permit ample time to procure reliefs, if required, and to give advance notice to the basic teams and the individuals involved. Advance notice on changes in qualifications would prevent the filling of needs which have already been satisfied by on-board training.

Some present placement offices have used the technique of personnel

requisitions from the basic teams. In other words, each basic team writes the type commander once each month reporting its needs. Such a system was used in DesPac (now CruDesPac) when the writer reported as personnel officer. It was of little value, as the vast majority of the basic teams reported everything they would like to have, rather than what they actually needed. One had to go to the personnel accounting reports in order to determine which of the requests were actually mandatory and which could not be supplied, because of existing shortages. These accounting reports were available anyway. Therefore, the personnel requisitions were superfluous and were eliminated. Basic teams should not be prevented from requesting personnel. However, such requests should be restricted to situations which are not reflected in the personnel accounting reports.

The Assistant Fleet Personnel Officer for Distribution and his first assistant, the Placement Control Officer, in consultation with the Fleet Commander and his staff, must determine the future personnel requirements of the fleet and then plan means of meeting this problem. Those needs which cannot be satisfied by outside input must be allocated to the various placement desks for planned removal of men from the existing teams. A secondary planning program must be undertaken at each of these desks to meet the quotas in view of what replacements can be expected. If a placement officer cannot meet his quotas at the proper time or in an efficient manner, the difference must be resolved in consultation with his seniors and an alternative course of action determined. With the entire planning function in one office, with a common purpose, all problems can be solved with a saving to the fleet and the people involved.

The planning problem is complex and involved, and because of this, a complete discussion will not be attempted. Planning must be adjusted to numerous factors. The important point for this discussion is that with future commitments and supply of manpower known, the fleet's central placement office can, by co-ordinated planning, anticipate the problems and determine a course of action before the problems become crises, as they do at present. With the function in one office with a geographic unity of control, co-ordinated planning is a possibility and a probability.

External Movement

External movement is the receipt and withdrawal of persons to and from the fleet. Either BuPers or the previously determined source of supply will send availability reports to the fleet's central placement office listing the name, rating or rate, service number, Navy job codes, expiration of enlistment date, duty preferences, place available, and date available of each person available for assignment to the fleet. In the case of large graduating classes from Naval recruit training centers with common basic qualifications, numbers may be used. If administratively feasible, however, name information would be an advantage for proper placement. Possibly the recruits could be assigned to the type of basic teams of their choice. This would be a morale factor. If availability reports could be determined weeks in advance of the date when the people are actually ready for assignment, the regular mails could be used more often. In cases where this is not possible, radio messages should be used to prevent lost productivity.

When the availability reports are received by the office, they would be sent to the Order Desk. Here each report would receive a separate serial

file number for internal references. The information would be transcribed on an incoming order form. This order form would be on a duplicator with a piece of carbon paper and a form underneath. The carbon copy would be used for the permanent file copy as the duplicator original is not too desirable for a permanent file. A sample copy of this form is illustrated on page one hundred forty-seven. The original duplicator form would be sent from the Order Desk to the Central Distribution Desk. Here the proper placement desks would be determined and entered on the form, see column (b) in section one and column (a) in section two. In the sample Jones and Roe were assigned to the Surface Combat Placement Desk and Bills was assigned to the Aviation Desk. The twenty-five general hand seamen apprentices on the availability report were broken down in section two at the Central Distribution Desk. Ten were assigned to the Surface Combat Desk (SC), five to the Aviation Desk (AV), and ten to the Shore Activities Desk (SA). Four copies of the order form were then run off, and one is sent to each of the following: Central Distribution Desk file, the Surface Combat Desk, the Aviation Desk, and the Shore Activities Desk. The original was returned to the Order Desk. The sample illustrated is the Surface Combat Desk's copy. The SC is entered in the heading for routing purposes. When this copy was received by the Surface Combat Desk, the detailed assignments were entered in column (a) of section one and column (b) of section two after consulting the status display boards and other planning devices. The copy was then returned to the Order Desk by each placement desk concerned. The entries were transcribed onto the original and the permanent file copy. The Order Desk then issued the necessary instructions to the Receiving Station at San Diego, California. Two copies of the completed

INCOMING ORDER NUMBER 421
AUTHORITY BuPers 012054Z
WHERE AVAILABLE RECSTA SDIEGO

SC
Placement Desk

1. Name break-down:

a	b	Name	Service No.	Rate	NJC	Duty Preference	D.A.	Remarks
DD711	SC	1 Jones John P	2638742	BMC	0101	DD	9/1	Dep. SDiego
DD788	SC	2 Roe Richard R	5439672	RD2	0302	CL	9/5	
	AV	3 Mills Ira M	2698209	PI3	3502	Staff	9/2	

2. Number break-down:

SA (0009)					
a. 25	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.
DESK 10-SC 5-AV 10-SA	ASSIGN 1-DD721 3-DD862 5-CL44 1-DE471	DESK	ASSIGN	DESK	ASSIGN

INCOMING ORDER FORM

original duplicator are made. One went to the Status Section and the other to the Placement Control Officer. The original was retained in case other copies were needed later, and the permanent file copy was placed in the files attached to the availability report and a copy of the instructions to the receiving station.

Withdrawals would be executed in a similar manner. When the quota for withdrawal was received from BuPers, a withdrawal file number would be assigned, and a duplicator original and a permanent file copy made. A sample of this form is shown on page one hundred forty-nine. The information contained in the order received from BuPers was transcribed in section one. In the sample order form BuPers ordered the fleet to provide one hundred seamen or seamen apprentice with no prescribed job codes to the Twelfth Naval District. They were to report by August 1st of the current year and were to have obligated service to August 1, 1952. The fleet was further required to provide two hundred airmen or airmen apprentice with no specified job code to the Naval Air Techuical Training Center. These people were to report on September 1st and were to have obligated service to September 1, 1953. The original, with section one completed, was then sent to the Central Distribution Desk where the quotas were assigned to the specific placement desks in accordance with their ability to provide. The sample illustrated is the Aviation Desk's copy. This desk was required to provide fifty of item 1 and two hundred of item 2. The details of the withdrawals were entered on each copy by each placement desk and returned to the Order Desk where the orders were sent to the respective basic teams and the file and report copies were made in a manner similar to incoming orders. Where withdrawals by name are used an extra

WITHDRAWAL ORDER NO. 116

AUTHORITY BuPers 0209173

AV
Placement desk

1. Withdrawal information:

	No.	Qualifications	Destination	Rep. Date	Remarks
1	100	SN/SA	12th N.D	8/1	EM sub. 8/1/52
2	200	AN/AA	NavAirTecTra	9/1	EM sub. 9/1/53
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					
11					
12					
13					
14					

2. Withdrawal assignment:

AV		SC		SS			
1 50	1 25-CV16 25-CV26	1 25		1 25			
2 200	2 100 NAS SDiego 100 NAS SFran						

WITHDRAWAL ORDER FORM

page could be attached to this form on which the placement desk lists the name information. Where orders are received for specific persons by name, a withdrawal memorandum is prepared by the Order Desk, sent to the Central Distribution Desk where the losses are noted, and then sent to the BuPers Shore-Duty Clearance Desk where the necessary co-ordination with the placement desk concerned is performed. The memorandum is then sent to the Order Desk, with the necessary information for the issuance of orders.

In the distribution phase which occurs at the Central Distribution Desk, placement aids such as ratings, job codes, etc., could be used to insure that the people available were assigned to the proper placement desk. This does not mean that the assignment of personnel is restricted by the specific job codes assigned to any one person. Each person must be fully qualified for the general duties of his rating. If, for example, the Submarine Desk is at its planned strength in a particular rating and submarine qualification, and a person of that particular qualification is available for assignment, he can be assigned to another desk which does have a need for a person of that general qualification. Personnel cannot be unfairly distributed just because of a particular job code which has been assigned. The job codes are a guide not a rule.

Men of the first three pay grades with no specific designation for any particular rating or branch of service will be distributed amongst the various placement desks on the basis of maintaining each at an equal percentage of over-all allowance (or complement if used). Those who have special job codes and who are not designated in any particular rating group cannot be classified as journeymen. They will receive more specific

treatment, however, at the placement desks where the specific basic team is determined as will each petty officer and designated man in pay grades 2 and 3.

For withdrawals when specific qualifications are specified, the Personnel Accounting Department can be of material assistance to the placement desks. The placement desk concerned can request all the personnel status cards (IBM cards) of the designated qualification in his basic teams. By means of machine sorting, the cards can be sorted quickly, and the desired cards sent to the placement desk. With these cards and the information on the status display boards, the most logical selection can be made. If there is no logical selection, the situation can be referred to the Placement Control Officer for further action.

Knowledge of the geographic movement of each basic team is of utmost importance for assignment, withdrawal, and future planning. The future operational plans are received from the fleet headquarters, and the daily location of each basic team is received from movement report centers. This information is reduced to convenient form for the office by the Fleet Movement Section.

In time of war and when there is a reserve of manpower available, the input to the fleet could be channelled to the various area pools after the basic teams operating and outfitting in the continental waters of the U.S.A. are accounted for. Replacements for basic teams in the forward areas could be assigned from the respective area pools. It is the function of the Pool Control Desk to insure that the flow to and the supply at each area pool is consistent with the anticipated needs in each area. Of course, if there is no reserve manpower in a particular rating

group or qualification, none can be allocated to the pools until all the existing needs in the basic teams have been rectified. The idea of maintaining reserve manpower in area pools is to reduce the travel time and provide on-the-spot action for replacement of losses.

If any placement desk has an urgent need for men with a specific qualification, a memorandum or oral request to the Placement Control Officer will establish a special priority or other appropriate action if the need is considered justified. The close co-ordination between the Placement Control Officer, and the various placement desks, which is possible in a set-up such as has been recommended will permit immediate planning for specific cases as well as over-all plans.

Internal Movement

Certain standard fleet policies need to be established regarding intra-fleet movement of personnel. Volunteers should be assigned to fleet administered shore duty before outside availables are so assigned, but their tour of duty should be limited to a specified period. This applies to staff personnel in desirable areas also. Provision must be made for transfers between basic teams at sea upon request. This will require that qualifications be set forth such as months of present duty, geographic proximity, etc. When requests from men who meet the qualifications are received, they should be given automatic approval unless some commander in the administrative chain of command or the placement officer indicates his disapproval. Fleet administered shore duty would be a matter of co-ordination between the Fleet-Administered Shore-Duty Desk, the Shore Activities Placement Desk, and the placement desk of the person concerned. The Placement Control Officer would make the final decision in any cases

of controversy.

Requests for transfer between basic teams is a matter for the placement officers to work out. All requests for a change should be sent to the placement desk of the person's basic team for consideration and action. If two placement desks are involved, both should agree that it is feasible and there should be no disapprovals in the endorsements. If there are no objections, an intra-fleet transfer request is sent to the Order Desk. If there were any disapprovals, the matter would be referred to the Placement Control Officer for final action. In certain cases he could seek the decision of the Assistant Fleet Personnel Officer where important controversies might arise. A sample of an intra-fleet transfer order is illustrated on page one hundred fifty-four. The particular sample indicates the manner in which the Order Desk would receive the request. A serial file number would be assigned on receipt. When the orders are issued, the original is placed in the Order Desk's files. A summary of all such transactions is sent to the Placement Control Officer and the Status Section each day. This form could be used for transfers between basic teams under one placement officer or for assignment for fleet-administered shore duty.

The Schools Department would issue order requests for all school quotas. Mandatory school quotas would be cleared through the Central Distribution Desk for allocation to a placement desk. Mandatory non-returnable quotas would be handled as ordinary external withdrawal quotas. Quotas assigned to basic teams in answer to a request for a quota would be issued by the Schools Department. The placement desk concerned would need only a copy of the intra-fleet order request in order to keep the Activity Distribution Report corrected. If it were not noted in this report on the

INTRA-FLEET TRANSFER REQUEST ____________________
(No. assigned by Order Desk)

From ___SC___ ___aJR___

To ___SS___ ___CAF___

____
(Placement Control Officer Order)

Issue orders for the transfer of:

Johnson, A.V.	1095684	0746	TM2
(Name or number)	(Service No.)	NJC	(Rating)

from ___DD 821___ at ___SDiego___

to ___SS 43___ at ___SFran___

date of execution ____________________ within ___5___ days

routine ______(check)

Means of transportation:

Air ___x___ priority ___3___

First avail. ________

Own expense ________

Pvt. vehicle ________

Type of orders:

Permanent ___x___

Temporary duty ________

Temadd ________

Temaddins ________

Means order transmission:

Msg ___x___ priority ___D___

Spdltr. ________

Air mail ________

Regular ________

Return (if other than permanent):

Date ____________________

Time ____________________

Remarks:

Personal request.

INTRA-FLEET TRANSFER REQUEST

man's line, transfer orders might be issued to persons who held school orders.

The nucleus crews for newly organized basic teams must be obtained from the placement desk concerned with the type of basic team required. The New Construction Desk would submit the requirements for each new basic team to the appropriate placement officer for procurement. The balance of the crews would come from outside input if possible. Otherwise, the Central Distribution Desk would have to assign quotas to the placement desks which could best afford the loss. Again, any controversies would be decided by the Placement Control Officer.

Transportation

As the Transportation Department must assign the required overseas transportation, this department must work closely with the placement desks, the Order Desk, and the Fleet Movements Section. If time were of the essence, the placement desk would have co-ordinated its orders with the transportation space available, requesting special priority if necessary. If movement is routine, the Order Desk would clear orders with the Transportation Department in order that people could arrive at the port where transportation would be available first. By co-ordinating personnel movement with carrier movement, non-productiveness can be reduced materially. There is no point in requiring orders to be executed before transportation space is available. There would be less chance for requiring the re-routing of persons to other points of embarkation or holding them in receiving stations until space is available if advance information on transportation were available. The problem of co-ordinating overseas transportation is a task of considerable magnitude, but if man-hours

of productivity can be saved, it is well worth the cost involved in administration.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

Deductions from the Study

It can be concluded that the existing system used in the Navy to control the placement and flow of its manpower falls short of meeting the criteria of an efficient system. In order that a distribution system may provide efficiency and economy in the utilization of the Navy's manpower, several fundamental principles or requirements must be satisfied, and these are:

1. The requirements of the basic teams.
2. The requirements of the individuals.
3. Administrative requirements.

In order to meet these fundamental requirements, the organization charged with the responsibility of controlling manpower distribution in the Navy must be able to co-ordinate its planning and its course of action. To fulfill these needs to a maximum degree, certain conditions must exist. These conditions can be stated as follows:

1. The organization must have the necessary authority to enforce its decisions.
2. It must have a minimum of echelons consistent with the magnitude of its task. If the work must be divided between subordinate echelons, the end result must be a co-ordinated effort with a common purpose.
3. The method used to place the plans into effect and control the results must be efficient and have maximum of simplicity. It also

must be standardized throughout the entire organization. It must obtain maximum results from the distribution aids already available.

4. The organization echelon charged with the responsibility of placement must have geographic unity and sufficient breadth in coverage. As basic teams in a given geographic area have a common purpose, geographic unity means co-ordinated control over inter-team personnel movement. Sufficient breadth of coverage provides maximum selectivity for withdrawal and maximum opportunity for accurate placement. It also minimizes the delays which normally arise out of communications.

5. The organization must be responsive to the needs of the line authority, as the only reason for its existence is to aid the line by providing the personnel required for its operations in the most efficient and economical manner.

It is evident that the conditions under which the present decentralized organization operates do not provide adequate co-ordinated planning or for a consistent course of action to meet fundamental requirements. Further decentralization would magnify the existing difficulties, therefore, the answer must lie in further centralization of the placement function. If the Navy were a stable organization in terms of its specific manpower requirements, the maximum advantage would be realized by centralizing the placement function on the BuPers level. Although industry has found advantages in decentralized placement at least on the lower occupational levels, the reasoning is not valid when carried to the Navy's situation because of the additional variables present. These variables are as follows:

1. Rotation. The military theory of rotation in duty for humanitarian and training reasons requires central planning.

2. Standard Navy human product. Because the various units of the naval organization perform a relatively standard function, and as its manpower must be rotated through these units, a standard human product is necessary. This begins with central procurement and requires centralized plans, action, training, and control to insure continuity.

3. The nucleus fundamental. As the peacetime naval personnel is the nucleus for wartime expansion; rotation, standardized training, and broad experience are a necessity. Again centralized plans, action, training, and control are required.

Centralization of the placement phase in BuPers does not meet one of the criteria, that of having an organization which will function in both peace and war. In wartime (and under the existing conditions in peacetime) the Navy is not stable. With instability the placement function cannot be centralized in one office for the entire Navy due to the magnitude of the problem. This was proven in the last war. Therefore, centralization of the placement function in BuPers must be ruled out.

The next logical point of centralization of this function is at the fleet level. At this level the following conditions exist:

1. Unity of command.
2. Complete area jurisdiction.
3. Relatively consistant composition.
4. Unity of purpose.
5. Ample personnel coverage.
6. Center of determination of operational plans.

7. Unity of function.

8. High command or authority.

On the surface the only criterion this method of organization would fail to meet is responsivness to the needs of the line command, and there only in its lack of close proximity to the individual operating teams. Some officers may consider the responsiveness of a central fleet placement activity to the fleet commander as sufficiently vague to preclude responsiveness to the subordinate line command. It is true that not all the officers of the fleet's basic teams could conveniently discuss their personnel problems personally with the staff of a central fleet placement activity. However, the writer recalls few conferences with the officers from the ships CruDesPac which uncovered needs which were not already known. Planning had accounted for them and they were to be filled as soon as men with the needed qualifications were available. Personnel problems other than needs could have been handled just as well by correspondence. While writing one's problems imposes a barrier for some officers, many problems could be handled on board the respective basic teams without correspondence. The bulk of the personnel problems brought to the writer personally had to be handled in this manner in any event.

It is sometimes too easy to bring personnel problems to the type commander's personnel officer and have an answer provided when the answer already existed in the Navy's manuals on board each ship and aircraft squadron in the Navy. The more time the personnel officer must devote to listening to needs he already knows of and problems he cannot solve personally, the less time he has to devote to what he should be doing really to help the basic teams. In peacetime, the type commander's

personnel officer is available to only about one half of the type command commanders for personnel conferences. In wartime this proportion is materially reduced, and he probably would be not more available than a central placement activity or office. Therefore, the variation from the criterion raised by centralization of the placement function on the fleet level is less than appears on the surface. It is at least as close as any other feasible type of organization would provide. The underlying objection by many persons would really be that the placement officer would be less available to pressure. In reality the placement officer at any desk in the central placement office would be in a better position to help as there would be greater chance of assistance from the other desks because of the co-ordinated action which could exist if the need warranted immediate action.

The solution of this thesis lies in the centralization of the placement phase of personnel distribution on the fleet level, with an efficient method for effecting planned action patterned along the lines suggested in Chapter VII. It is not felt that the suggested method and organization of the office is the ultimate. It does provide a basis upon which to start. If and when the plan is placed into action, changes may be necessary as specific problems are faced. It is firmly believed that centralization on the fleet level would cure many of the existing ills of manpower distribution. Those it did not cure would be reduced to the lowest possible minimum.

Problems to be Faced

There will be several forces aligned against any proposal for change. The two primary forces are the inertia of the status quo and the opposition

of the type commanders. These will be reenforced by their proponents throughout the service.

There is a natural resistance to change all up and down the hierarchical line. This is sometimes amplified in the military services by the lack of a profit motive. It is easier to "keep the ship on an even keel" than to attempt a change. The existing organization may have face validity, "empires" are constructed through the passage of time, and there is a definite tendency to flow with the tide rather than overcome the inertia of the status quo. Such an attitude is difficult to oppose. Although the monetary motive may not exist, the need for efficiency and economy still exists, however, saving of productivity and more efficient utilization of skills is somewhat less effective in overcoming inertia. Many people do not want to attempt change as it means subjecting oneself to possible failure and possible irritation of the wrong people.

The second factor, which overlaps with the first, but is more specific, is the desire to retain what autonomy now exists. The type and area commanders will zealously guard their relative autonomy over the control of their portion of the personnel flow. This is natural, as anyone feels that to produce results or ends one must have control of all the means. Personnel performance is definitely a means to the end efficiency of the type or area commander. Any intrusion into any phase of personnel adminitration autonomy will be vigorously attacked. There is no intention in the proposed change to remove any authority of the type or area commanders which they must have to perform their functions adequately. The distribution of personnel is only a part of personnel administration. Personnel distribution itself can be further subdivided into its important

phases. First is the function of drawing up the plans for the establishment of priorities for manpower amongst the basic teams on the basis of supply and demand. The type commander bases his plans on fleet operations plans and fleet composition plans. This is a function which can very easily be relinquished to the fleet central placement office and gain the advantages of centralized plans and action. This will not interfer with the type commanders administrative responsibility. The same applies to the area commanders. The second phase is the anticipation of future manpower needs by training programs. The proposed plan would not remove any of the type or area commander's responsibility or authority in this field. It would merely remove the mechanics to a higher level which has greater team coverage, thereby, making it possible to consider the teams more adequately in removals for mandatory quotas. The returnable quotas would be granted on request from the teams as they now are. The third phase of distribution is the more or less mechanical phase of matching qualifications with complement or allowance vacancies. The same needs would be filled by the fleet central placement office as now filled by the type and area commanders, only better. This would not lessen the ability of the basic teams to perform. It would help them to perform better because more manpower would be conserved for performance.

The great bulk of control over personnel administration would remain in the hands of the type and area commanders. The type and area commanders would still need their personnel officers as advisors on personnel matters. The administration of personnel is a function of the line commands. Technical matters on personnel continually arise in the administrative commands. There are regulations to promulgate, administrative control over advancement, an endless flow of correspondence to make

recommendations on or take action on, complements and allowances must be continually reviewed to keep them abreast of changing technology, and many, many other personnel problems which the type and area commanders must handle. Pursual of the BuPers Manual will give the reader any number of reasons why an administrative commander would need a personnel officer. Removal of the more mechanical functions would save this personnel officer the frustrations of trying to do a part of his job in the dark. The writer remembers only a small part of his daily work which was devoted to the actual mechanics of placement while a type commander's personnel officer. The bulk of the time was spent in planning and supervising the personnel administration of the many basic teams. The planning done in distribution was very disheartening as it had to be changed daily due to lack of adequate information from higher levels. It was while attempting to out guess the unknown that the seeds for this study were sown.

In order to overcome the inertia and the opposition of those who will lose autonomy in the placement function, the advantages to be gained by the Navy must be shown to the top Navy command and the commanders on the lower administrative echelons. There will be opposition, that is to be expected, and it is doubted if the inertia of the status quo and the specific opposition can be overcome until a crisis makes the need of greater efficiency urgent. The Korean crisis has prompted a move in the direction of centralization. This move would not have occurred unless the lost productivity due to the inherent delays in the present system had made the need urgent. It is believed that a war of greater proportions than now exists will complete the change to centralization of placement on the fleet level, independent of the control of the type and area

commanders. This would be mandatory, as the cost of maintaining the status quo would be prohibitive. Each type commander could not be allowed a separate pool in each forward area. The receiving stations could not hold mass manpower waiting for transportation or assignment. Communications could not afford the administrative traffic of the sprawling placement organization. Economy of effort and manpower would be a necessity. This need of simplification, economy and efficiency would be a sufficient force to overcome inertia and opposition. It is not anticiapted that the results of this study will be applied immediately, however, the move in this direction as the inefficiencies of the present system is beginning to be realized by the higher commands including BuPers. It is fully realized that the proposed complete centralization of the placement function on the fleet level will take time, but it is hoped that when the move is made, the results of this study may serve as a starting point for the new organization.

It will be remembered that in an earlier chapter the writer spoke of a proposed centralization plan initiated by BuPers and sent to the fleet commanders for their comment. This proposal was for the personnel officers of the type commanders to be physically located in the fleet personnel office in order to remove some of the problems in personnel distribution which came to light during the Korean War. It was a preliminary attempt to remove some of the inefficiencies which now exist.[1] Since the completion of this study, copies of the replies to BuPers by the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets have been made available to the writer, and it is considered appropriate to note

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[1] See page 114.

comments made.

The need for centralization was generally conceded by the fleet commanders. The Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet was more in favor of suchaa move than the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet although the latter conceded it would be more efficient. The type commanders were generally opposed to such a move. It is believed by the writer that the main objections were due to the loss of their personnel officers and the desire to retain closer control over their personnel distribution. Extracts from the comments of the Commander, Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet and concurred in by the Fleet Commander are as follows:[2]

> While all the type commands opposing are reluctant to have their force personnel officer physically located at the Headquarters of ComServLant, some indicate that there would be little objection to the assignment of a more junior representative authorized to effect initial distribution into the individual ships of the type.
>
> ComServLant feels most strongly that the Bureau proposal would be of much benefit to the Atlantic Fleet as a whole. A substantial decrease in the number of lost man-hours would be immediately apparent. Further, a valuable shift toward wartime procedures would be accomplished.
>
> In addition to those important advantages listed in reference (a) [the BuPers proposal noted on page one hundred fourteen], attention is invited to the fact that the proposed system has already had a thorough practical test and has proved eminently successful. In August 1950, in an effort to expedite the distribution of enlisted personnel and avoid wasteful time-lags, ComCruLant [Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet], with the full approval of the Commander in Chief, placed the Cruiser Force Personnel Officer physically in the office of the Fleet Personnel office. All experience to date has definitely indicated the merit of this action. Reduction in lost man-hours has been most gratifying. Reduction in message and mail traffic

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[2] Letter from Commander Service Force, Atlantic Fleet to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet dated February 22, 1951. The Fleet Commander concurred in the remarks but desired the sending of officer representatives to the Fleet Personnel Office be on a voluntary basis.

has been spectacular. Although ComCruLant has spent the last five (5) months in the Mediterranean, difficulties incident to the physical separation from his personnel officer have been so minor as to be without significance.

Commander Service Force considers that the current enlisted distribution system, while workable in peacetime, is too limited and slow for war-time conditions. It is a peacetime luxury which, while giving the type commander authority to distribute within his type, is too awkward and wasteful for war-time administration. The system currently in use was not satisfactory during the last war and, with few exceptions, was speedily abandoned. The current system was not satisfactory during the quasi-mobilization incident to the Korean situation in the summer of 1950. On that occasion it was immediately abandoned until the emergency conditions had been dealt with successfully by direct distribution from the Fleet Personnel Office. In the light of this evidence, Commander Service Force holds no hope that the present system will be acceptable in any war of the future. It is considered that centralization of control of enlisted personnel distribution is inevitable if we are to avoid the chaotic conditions which existed in many theaters in the early phases of World War II. As pointed out by BuPers, it seems only prudent to shift now, while we have time, to that system which we expect to use in the event of hostilities.

In deference to the comments and recommendations of the opposing type commanders, as contrasted with the opinions expressed in the preceding paragraphs, the following recommendations are submitted:

a. Authorize continuance of the current system for those Type Commanders who are opposed to any change.

b. Authorize those Type Commanders who so desire, to order their Personnel Officer to the Staff of Commander Service Force for additional duty as the Type Commander's representative for personnel.

c. Authorize those Type Commanders who so desire, to order an Assistant Personnel Officer to the Staff of Commander Service Force for additional duty as the Type Commander's representative for Enlisted Distribution.

Approval of the above recommendations might appear to result in different systems in effect within the Atlantic Fleet. In practice it would result in different administrative techniques, as a result of physical location, being employed to administer the several points of the same system. That this is no real obstacle is evidenced by the fact that this condition has existed in a lesser measure for the past five (5) months. The above compromise solution is most strongly recommended, not only because it is considered that dissenting Type Commanders may, in due course of time, become aware of the dominant merits of the Bureau's proposal; but also because it represents a substantial step toward the perfection of that system which is considered to be certain of adoption soon after the commencement of

> hostilities. The closer we can now approach such a system, the less will be the confusion experienced when the change in systems can no longer be avoided.

It can be noted that the need for centralization of personnel distribution is strongly believed in by the Service Force Commander and is concurred in by the Fleet Commander. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet takes a slightly different attitude regarding what should be done but still believes that the BuPers proposal would give more efficiency. In brief this Commander's remarks are as follows:[3]

> CINCPACFLT concurs that the presence of type commander personnel distribution representatives at the headquarters of COMWESTSEAFRON would provide closer liaison and more efficient distribution of enlisted personnel with a consequent saving of time and money. However, the representative should not be the type commanders' personnel officer. The personnel officer is the type commander's principal advisor in all personnel matters and should remain with the type commander who has many personnel responsibilities in addition to the distribution of enlisted personnel. A type commander's personnel distribution representative rather than the type commander's personnel officer should be ordered to additional duty at the headquarters of COMWESTSEAFRON. This representative should remain under the command of the type commander assigned additional duty with COMWESTSEAFRON.
>
> . . . it is recommended that the Personnel Accounting Machine Installations in the Pacific be consolidated at the Headquarters of COMWESTSEAFRON as an economy move. . . . This action would consolidate the gathering and dissemination of personnel statistics at one centrally located point as well as speed up the utilization of these statistics by those who need to know.

The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet continued by recommending that during war the type commander continue to control placement through his representative at the fleet distribution center. He further recommended that for the present the sending of a representative to the central office be on an optional basis.

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[3] Letter from Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to Chief of Naval Personnel, serial 897, dated February 17, 1951.

In general it seems that the Atlantic Fleet Commander is in favor of full centralization ultimately, and the Pacific Fleet Commander prefers the status quo with some ultimate centralization by having type commanders' representatives in the fleet office. The writer would like to suggest the following in light of the opinions of the fleet commanders:

1. If complete centralization of placement on the fleet level is inevitable during the next major war, why wait? Will there be time during the beginning of the next major war, which will be sudden, to make complex changes? Should we not have things ready to function when time will be of the essence?

2. Placing the distribution representatives of the type commanders in the fleet office certainly is a step in the right direction, but can there be co-ordinated planning and action in the fleet office, which must be rapid during a war if each representative is responsible to a remote command? Will not all major decisions have to be the result of much correspondence between the type commanders and their representatives? Will not planning on the type commander's level be further complicated by separation from their distribution representative?

It seems clear that complete centralization is necessary for co-ordinated plans, action, and control. Also it is necessary that the placement function be performed with speed and efficiency. It is difficult to see how any compromise will be permitted during the demands for action the next full scale war will bring. The system which is necessary must be functioning perfectly before the first blow is struck. Delay will be costly. It is believed that the transition will be slow until war makes it necessary, but can the service afford the ultimate cost?

Results to be Expected

If opposition can be overcome and the distribution organization of the Navy so reorganized as to place the placement phase of distribution on the fleet level, many improvements in the Navy's manpower flow can be expected. Some of the benefits will accrue more rapidly than others. Much depends upon the calibre and experience of the officers and enlisted personnel assigned to the central fleet placement offices. It is assumed that if such a move is taken, only the best prepared people will be so assigned to those offices.

The advantages of centralization lie in the greater ability to plan and co-ordinate a logical course of action. Due to the closer proximity to the source of action, BuPers and the fleet commanders, and the reduction of the BuPers span of technical control, information can be supplied more rapidly on anticipated personnel movements and requirements. The delays of the successive stages of planning, communications through the chain of command, and successive line responsibilities will be materially reduced or eliminated. Through administrative economy the manpower needs of the Navy can better be served.

To summarize, the advantages to be gained by the centralization of the placement phase of personnel distribution at the fleet level are:

1. Greater permanency of personnel.
2. Career planning.
3. Maximum utilization of manpower.
4. Optimum application of training for advancement in skills.
5. Greater possibility of meeting not only the Navy's over-all manpower need, but each specific need.
6. Economy in manpower movement.
7. Reduction of administrative delays.
8. Standardization of methods.
9. Insurance against enemy destruction of nerve centers.
10. Area personnel service to the basic teams under central control.

11. Relief of key personnel before transfer.
12. Greater strength of top level representation of personnel placement problems.
13. Reduction of unwarranted pressures on personnel flow.
14. A consolidated force for improvement of distribution aids.
15. Increased Navy morale.
16. More accurate placement.

All these are gained through the possibility of co-ordinated planning and course of action.

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